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OLD WHINE IN A NEW BATTLE: PRAGMATIC
APPROACHES TO BALANCING THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND
THE DIRECT SHIPPING OF WINE
Gordon Eng*
INTRODUCTION
There are only two ways an ordinary citizen acting in a private
capacity can violate the United States Constitution. One is to en-
slave someone, violating the Thirteenth Amendment, and the other
is to bring a bottle of wine into a state in violation of its alcoholic
beverage control laws.'
In reaction to what many consider to be senseless and out-of-
date prohibitions against the direct shipment of wine from out-of-
state wineries to consumers, 2 wine connoisseurs and their legal ad-
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Charles Whelan, my faculty advisor. ULJ Editors Kim Smith and Mark D. Shifton
were instrumental in editing and encouraging this Note. I dedicate this work to my
wife Yoko, the love of my life, and to our daughters Emily, Katy, and Alyssa, who
have brought us endless joy and pride with their achievements, intelligence, and hu-
mor. I also dedicate this work to my parents and my sister Judy, the first lawyer in the
family. Finally, I welcome this opportunity to thank my friend and mentor, Claudia
Anelos, Clinical Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, who en-
couraged and inspired me to study law, and who, by word and deed, has demonstrated
that one really can change the world-one person at a time.
1. Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Les-
sons From the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 217, 220 (1995).
[T]here are two ways, and two ways only, in which an ordinary private citi-
zen, acting under her own steam and under color of no law, can violate the
United States Constitution. One is to enslave somebody, a suitably hellish
act. The other is to bring a bottle of beer, wine, or bourbon into a State in
violation of its beverage control laws - an act that might have been thought
juvenile, and perhaps even lawless, but unconstitutional?
Id.
2. See Andrew J. Kozusko III, Note and Comment: The Fight to "Free the
Grapes" Enters Federal Court: Constitutional Challenges to the Validity of State
Prohibitions on the Direct Shipment of Alcohol, 20 J.L. & COM. 75, 75-76 (2000) (de-
tailing the changes in the wine industry over recent years and the rise of boutique and
specialty wines commanding prices in the thousands of dollars per bottle).
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vocates have mounted a campaign across the country to overturn
direct-shipment laws.3 According to Tracy Genesen, Legal Director
for the Coalition for Free Trade ("CFT"), a winery backed advo-
cacy group, the overall strategy is to "target the states with the
most punitive direct-shipping statutes, to get a definitive decision
from the Supreme Court to clear up the question of whether the
Commerce Clause takes precedence over the Twenty-first Amend-
ment or vice versa."4 The CFT's strategy is to facilitate a split be-
tween at least two circuit courts that will have to be resolved in the
nation's highest court.5 Whether the strategy succeeds in getting
the Supreme Court's attention remains to be seen, but one element
appears to be working: lawsuits seeking to overturn direct-ship-
ment statutes are generating conflicting opinions in federal district
courts across the country and in at least two federal appellate
courts.6
Although not a party to the lawsuit, the CFT probably joined the
celebration on December 10, 2002, when Judge Richard M.
Berman of the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York ordered New York State to allow wineries from
the rest of the country to ship wine directly to New York consum-
ers.7 Judge Berman's order followed up on his opinion earlier that
year holding New York's direct-shipping laws unconstitutional. 8
Clint Bolick, the attorney for the plaintiffs, called Judge Berman's
initial ruling "the crest of a tidal wave that is washing away protec-
tionist barriers to the direct shipment of wine."9 Marc Violette, a
spokesman for New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer,
said simply: "We are going to appeal."'1
If New York does appeal, it will have significant ammunition -
despite the trend in recent cases where direct-shipment wine advo-
cates appear to be prevailing. For example, the Seventh Circuit
3. Wine Spectator Online, Tide Turns in Direct Shipping Battle (October 21,
2002), at http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Archives/Show-Article/0,1275,3880,00.
html (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding lower court
finding that North Carolina's direct-shipment law is unconstitutional); Bridenbaugh v.
Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court's finding Indi-
ana's direct-shipment statute unconstitutional).
7. Howard G. Goldberg, New York Ordered to Allow Direct Shipments of Wine,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at B5.
8. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
9. Goldberg, supra note 7, at B5.
10. Id.
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Court of Appeals recently upheld an Indiana statute with similar
prohibitions against out-of-state shipments.11 Nevertheless, New
York will face a difficult legal battle. On April 8, 2003, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its decision, affirming a fed-
eral district court decision last year declaring North Carolina's di-
rect-shipment laws unconstitutional.' 2 With this clear circuit split,
the CFT may well be getting its wish; ultimately, the Supreme
Court may have to settle the issue once and for all. The nation's
highest court, however, appears willing to let the conflict age a bit
longer. 13
This Note examines the tension between the Twenty-First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, with respect to state regulations governing of
out-of-state direct shipment of wine to consumers. When Judge
Melinda Harmon, sitting in the Federal District Court, Southern
District Texas, considered this issue in a recent case she noted that,
"The question of the constitutionality of state bans on direct im-
portation of wine by in-state consumers from out-of-state wineries
has become increasingly controversial, yet thus far there is minimal
case law dealing with the question."14 One side of the debate is
emobidied in Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment, which
provides: "The transportation or importation into any State, Terri-
tory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited." The weight of this provision stems from early Su-
preme Court cases that gave states wide latitude in exercising this
power.15 The other side of this Constitutional debate is embodied
in the Commerce Clause, giving Congress the power "to regulate
11. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 848.
12. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming the holding of
the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, finding
North Carolina's direct-shipment laws unconstitutional).
13. Id.
14. Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
15. See, e.g., Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391,
394 (1939) (holding the right to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating
liquor is not limited by the Commerce Clause); Ziffren, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132,
138 (1939) (finding the "Twenty-first Amendment sanctions the right of a State to
legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, unfettered by the
Commerce Clause"); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62
(1936) (upholding a California statute imposing a licensing fee on the import of beer
noting that such a fee would be unconstitutional as a "direct burden on interstate
commerce" if not for the Twenty-First Amendment).
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Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states.' 16
The strength on this position stems not from what is expressed, but
from what is not. The courts have traditionally construed the Com-
merce Clause as both an express grant to Congress of power to
regulate interstate commerce, and a restriction on the authority of
the states to regulate interstate trade. 7 The Constitution is not
clear about where the boundaries of the Commerce Clause lie
when Congress has not explicitly addressed an issue. 8 As Consti-
tutional law professors John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda observe:
"When Congress has not spoken clearly, the Court and commenta-
tors often refer to this question as the dormant (or negative) Com-
merce Clause problem." 19 The problem is determining the extent
to which states can legislate in a manner that may impinge on inter-
state commerce when there is no federal law on point.20 As Nowak
and Rotunda explain, courts are "in effect attempting to interpret
the meaning of Congressional silence."' 21 Although not always a
straightforward or uncontested position, the courts have generally
interpreted the dormant Commerce Clause to prevent States from
promulgating protectionist laws that burden interstate commerce.22
In the absence of case law on point, district courts apply prece-
dents dealing with resolving conflicts between the Commerce
Clause and Twenty-First Amendment, generally.23 Although the
existing body of law provides a starting point for amelioration, as
Judge Harmon noted, "It quickly becomes apparent that this is a
gray area of law, without bright lines and clear rules, as well as a
constantly evolving one. There is little agreement on what ap-
proach should be taken. Court opinions in recent years vary
widely ....
Part I of this Note follows leading court opinions and commenta-
tors in recognizing the importance of history with respect to the
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that "Congress shall have Power to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes").
17. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 138 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
18. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.1 (6th
ed. 2000).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (noting that
"district courts facing challenges to such laws must look for guidance to case law ad-
dressing more generally the dormant commerce clause and its complex relationship to
the Twenty-First Amendment.").
24. Id.
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Twenty-First Amendment. 25 Part II examines recent court deci-
sions, identifying commonality in these opinions, including four ap-
proaches taken by federal courts to address this issue, and
distinguishing factors that appear to influence the courts' final
holdings. Part III of this Note offers a possible solution to the con-
flict. Despite the trend toward relaxing alcoholic beverage control
laws, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, being applied by a
number of courts against direct-shipment laws, is fundamentally
flawed.
I. THE ABCs OF DIRECT-SHIPMENT LAWS
Direct-shipment laws have existed since the repeal of Prohibi-
tion, and are often part of a three-tier system embodied in many
states' alcoholic beverage control laws ("ABC laws"). 26 Typically,
ABC laws constrain manufacturers of alcoholic beverages by re-
quiring them to sell only to licensed wholesalers or distributors.27
The wholesalers themselves are restricted to selling only to licensed
retailers.28 Then, only licensed retailers are permitted to sell di-
rectly to consumers. 29 Many states' ABC laws provide that all out-
of-state sellers of alcoholic beverages (of which wine is but one
product) must pass through that state's three-tier system before
reaching the consumer. Typically, however, these states provide an
important exception-permitting in-state wineries to ship directly
to in-state consumers. 30 In-state wineries can bypass the wholesale
25. See, e.g,. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-208 (1976) (reviewing the history of
state regulations of alcoholic beverages from pre-Eighteenth Amendment to modern
times); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 336 (1964)
(Black, J., dissenting); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 439-43 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(providing a short historical review of The Wilson Act, The Webb-Kenyon Act, The
Federal Alcohol Administration Act, and the Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement
Act of 2000); Loretto Winery Ltd. v. Gazzara, 601 F. Supp. 850, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(providing a review of the history of Prohibition). In addition, a helpful review of the
history and background of direct-shipment laws is found in, Vijay Shanker, Alcohol
Direct Shipment Laws, The Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 85
VA. L. REV. 353, 355-59 (1999). A more detailed history of alcoholic beverage regula-
tion is found in, Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control
Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161,
162-63 (1991).
26. See Shanker, supra note 25, at 355.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 2002) (identify-
ing the primary issue of the appeal as, "whether the State of Florida may prohibit out-
of-state wineries from shipping their products directly to Florida consumers while per-
mitting in-state wineries to do so"); Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848,
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and retail tiers to reach in-state consumers, while out-of-state win-
eries are subjected to all three tiers with the concomitant costs and
taxes.31 Direct-shipment opponents identify that disparity as an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.32
Proponents of direct-shipping bans33 rest their case primarily on
the strength of the Twenty-First Amendment arguing that, al-
though the three-tier system is not perfect, it addresses the core
concerns of temperance, tax collection, and the maintenance of or-
derly markets.34 Many Americans today find it difficult to relate to
851 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the district court considered the issue that, "Indiana
permits local wineries, but not wineries 'in the business of selling in another state or
country,' to ship directly to Indiana consumers"); Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d
464, 466-67 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (reviewing the issue before the court and noting that
North Carolina, like many states, regulates the sale of alcoholic beverages through a
three-tier system but with a significant exception-in-state wineries can bypass the
wholesaler and retailer and ship wine directly to North Carolina consumers, while
out-of-state wineries do not benefit from the same access), affd in part, vacated in
part, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003); Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (substantially
upholding the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge who concluded:
The case, reduced to its essence, is a constitutional challenge to the Virginia
regulatory scheme which prohibits the shipment from outside Virginia of any
beer, wine or distilled spirits directly to a consumer inside Virginia (direct
shipment) without it passing through a Virginia licensed wholesaler or re-
tailer while at the same time it allows shipment of beer and wine from Vir-
ginia producers within the state directly to consumers inside and outside of
Virginia).
31. Russ Miller, Note, The Wine is in the Mail: The Twenty-First Amendment and
State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. REV.
2495, 2497-99 (2001) (explaining the typical three-tier system of alcohol regulation by
many states and the additional costs incurred by out-of-state wineries forced to sell
through the three-tier system).
32. See cases cited supra note 30.
33. Although mostly State regulatory authorities and wholesale distributors pre-
sumably have an interest in maintaining the status quo, there are many citizen groups
who support continued close regulation of alcohol and its availability, particularly
with regard to minors. In Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 136-37 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), for example, defendants were joined by Dr. Calvin 0. Butts as well as a coali-
tion of local university administrators including Fordham University. The primary
concerns of the schools were the "devastating consequences" of removing the direct-
shipment bans on alcoholic beverages and the increased access of alcohol to minors.
See Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support
of Their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and Reply Memorandum of the State
University of New York, The City University of New York, Fordham University, and
St. Francis College as Amici Curiae in Suppport of Defendants and Intervenor-De-
fendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Swedenburg (No. 00 CV 778)
(RMB), available at http:// www. coalitionft.org/litigation/newyork NYDefendant
CrossSJ.pdf (last visited May 2, 2003).
34. See, e.g., Swedenburg, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 139 (explaining that the defendants
relied primarily on the Twenty-First Amendment and argued the State had acted
within its "core powers" to regulate alcoholic beverages for use within the state). De-
fendants further contended the New York scheme legitimately advanced interests
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the mood in the United States during the time leading up to Prohi-
bition." With the rise of the Internet and the commercial fluidity
"e-shopping" provides, many young sophisticates are unable to
place the Twenty-First Amendment in proper perspective.36 When
compared to the rise of economics as almost the sine qua non sub-
ject in a university education and its mantra of "free trade," there
is probably an instinctive leaning among lawyers and law students
toward the arguments grounded on the dormant Commerce
Clause.37 To fully appreciate the justification for a broad reading
of the Twenty-First Amendment, proponents of direct-shipping
laws typically combine their legal arguments with a historical re-
view. As one court explained, this is "not solely out of nostalgia or
a fascination with our political history ... but in order to establish
the historical background against which, first the Eighteenth and
then the Twenty-First Amendments to the Constitution were put in
place. '38
"protected by the Twenty-First Amendment including, promoting temperance, ensur-
ing orderly market conditions, and raising revenue." Id.
35. The events leading up to Prohibition began in the mid-nineteenth century.
The Eighteenth Amendment was passed in 1920, while the Twenty-First Amendment
was passed in 1933.
36. See Kozusko, supra note 2, at 75-78 (arguing that direct-shipment laws are
unconstitutional). The "absurd results of the stringent state laws that prevent con-
sumers in a majority of states from purchasing many of the wines that they desire," as
well as "recent dramatic changes in the wine industry and the development of the
internet," have motivated frustrated wine consumers to take action. Id. at 75; see also
John Foust, Note, State Power to Regulate Alcohol Under the Twenty-First Amend-
ment: The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty-First Amendment Enforcement
Act, 41 B.C. L. REV. 659, 659-60 (2000) (arguing that direct-shipment laws are uncon-
stitutional and describing the author's personal experience, before law school, work-
ing at a California winery where visitors were frustrated and disappointed to learn of
direct-shipment bans emanating from their home states); Miller, supra note 31, at
2496 (arguing that out-of-state shipment bans may exist only if states also prohibit in-
state direct shipment and noting that despite the Internet revolution, some wine con-
sumers feel frustrated because of their inability to buy wine online and have it
shipped to their homes).
37. Shanker, supra note 25, at 367 ("Consumers are the most obvious party nega-
tively impacted by direct-shipment laws. In general, consumers are hurt by limited
choice and higher prices that result from in-state monopolies. In particular, wine con-
noisseurs are prevented from obtaining the rare wines that they desire." (citing
Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST.
COMMENT. 395, 413 (1986) ("[L]aws that protect in-state firms from competition in
local markets have the effect of raising prices, so the ultimate burden is borne by local
consumers."))).
38. Loretto Winery Ltd. v. Gazzara, 601 F. Supp. 850, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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A. The Early Years
The tension between the Commerce Clause and state authority
to regulate alcoholic beverages dates well into the nineteenth cen-
tury.39 The Supreme Court first recognized the authority of the
states to regulate alcoholic beverages in the License Cases.4 0 The
Court noted that state authority was "free from implied restrictions
under the Commerce Clause."' 4t After the Civil War, the temper-
ance movement picked up momentum and states began to amend
their constitutions to increase their control over alcohol. 42 Kansas
was the first state to go dry in 1880, via constitutional amend-
ment.43 The Supreme Court, in Mugler v. Kansas,44 upheld the
amendment despite constitutional challenges holding that the Kan-
sas amendment was fairly adapted to protect the community from
the evils of alcohol. 45 This was followed three years later, however,
by Leisy v. Hardin,46 which significantly weakened the holding of
the License Cases.47 The facts surrounding the Leisy decision attest
to the difficulty of closing all the loopholes in state attempts to
regulate alcoholic beverages.
1. Leisy v. Hardin
Emboldened by the success of the Mugler decision, Kansas and
Iowa eagerly asserted states' rights in regulating alcoholic bever-
ages.n8 Iowa promulgated strict regulations on alcohol as soon as it
was transported into the state.n9 The Iowa statute only licensed
pharmacists to sell liquor "for pharmaceutical and medicinal pur-
poses . . . and wine for sacramental purposes."50 In addition, to
qualify for a local permit to sell intoxicating liquors, one could not
be the "keeper of a hotel, eating-house, saloon, restaurant, or place
39. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205 (1976) (noting "the history of state regula-
tion of alcoholic beverages dates from long before adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment" (citing the License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 579 (5 How. 1847))).
40. See id. (stating that the Court in the License Cases, 46 U.S. 504 (1847), "recog-
nized a broad authority in state governments to regulate the trade of alcoholic bever-
ages within their borders.").
41. Craig, 429 U.S. at 205.
42. Spaeth, supra note 25, at 171-72.
43. Id.
44. Id. at n.63 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
45. Id.
46. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 124 (1890).
47. Craig, 429 U.S. at 205 (noting that Leisy v. Hardin "undercut the theoretical
underpinnings of the License Cases").
48. Spaeth, supra note 25, at 171-72.
49. Id.
50. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 105.
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of public amusement."51 A clever entrepreneurial family operating
out of Peoria, Illinois, nevertheless saw a loophole in the regula-
tions and moved to exploit it.52 A member of the firm by the name
of John Leisy, received shipments of prohibited beverages from
Illinois, and put them up for sale in unbroken kegs and cases.5 3 By
keeping the liquor in its original and unopened packaging, he
stopped short of running an unlawful saloon. By not serving liquor
for consumption by his customers at his place of business, John
Leisy, in effect, ran an agency business in alcohol.54 Iowa did not
see it that way, however, and seized the shipment. Leisy sued in
replevin to recover the confiscated shipment. The United States
Supreme Court ruled in Leisy's favor, holding that the liquor re-
mained an article of interstate commerce as long as it remained in
its original and unopened packaging, and thus, the seizure consti-
tuted an invalid restraint on interstate commerce. 6
Since few standards existed as to what constituted an original
package, the Leisy decision opened the way for "original package"
saloons.57 The states countered the new loophole with help from
Congress. A year after the Court decided Leisy, Congress passed
the Wilson Act mandating that all liquor transported into a state be
treated the same as liquor manufactured within the state, regard-
less of whether it remained in its original packaging. 8
2. Rhodes v. Iowa
No sooner was the original package loophole plugged, than an-
other one appeared in the form of mail order alcohol purchases;
the precursor to today's Internet purchases.59 Iowa challenged the
loophole, but the Supreme Court, in Rhodes v. Iowa, upheld mail
order alcohol purchases.6 ° The Court carefully parsed the language
51. Id. at 106.
52. Id. at 100-02 (describing the operations of Gus. Leisy & Co., whose principal
place of business was Peoria, Ill., in shipping sealed cases of beer into Keokuk, Iowa,
to be sold and offered for sale in the original and sealed case of the manufacturer by
the company's agent, Mr. John Leisy, a resident of Keokuk and agent for Gus. Leisy
& Co.).
53. Id. at 101 (noting that kegs and cases of intoxicating liquors were left in their
original and unopened shipping packages).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 102.
56. Id.
57. Spaeth, supra note 25, at 172.
58. Id. at n.72. (citing Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (current version at
27 U.S.C. § 121 (1988))).
59. Id. at 172.
60. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 426 (1898).
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of the Wilson Act as to the meaning of "upon arrival in such State"
and held that this did not mean the actual physical crossing of in-
toxicating liquors across a state line.61 Instead, the Court con-
cluded the phrase meant the completion of the transportation by
the common carrier to the ultimate consignee of the merchandise
within the state.62 In other words, while in transit within state bor-
ders and while under the care of a common carrier, the intoxicating
liquor was not subject to Iowa's regulations, despite the Wilson
Act. Since the consignee was not in the business of reselling the
shipment, there was not much Iowa or any state could do about
it. 6
3
The Rhodes Court held that prohibiting shipment of mail-order
liquor constituted an impermissible burden on interstate com-
merce.64 The Court pointed out that the burden on interstate com-
merce in Rhodes was even more compelling than in Leisy.65 It
reasoned that the right to sell the original packages in Leisy was
important, but only indirectly, since contracts of sale normally fell
under the purview of local legislative authority.66 In Rhodes, on
the other hand, the court reasoned:
The right to contract for the transportation of merchandise from
one state into or across another involved interstate commerce in
its fundamental aspect, and imported in its very essence a rela-
tion which necessarily must be governed by laws apart from the
laws of the several states, since it embraced a contract which
must come under the laws of more than one state.67
After Rhodes, the mail order business flourished in Iowa and
elsewhere.68
3. The Webb-Kenyon Act
The prohibitionists' response to Rhodes, the Webb-Kenyon Act,
took fifteen years to promulgate.69 Passed over President Taft's
veto, the Act extended the reach of the Wilson Act by essentially
61. Id. at 422-23.
62. Id.
63. Spaeth, supra note 25, at 173.
64. Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 424.
65. Id..
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Spaeth, supra note 25, at 173.
69. Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (current version at 27 U.S.C.
§122 (1982)).
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stripping liquor of its interstate character. 70 Even the full title and
text of the Act made clear its intent: "An Act Divesting Intoxicat-
ing Liquors of Their Interstate Character in Certain Cases."'71 The
Act did more than simply prohibit the introduction of liquor into a
state against the local laws - it went a step further by removing
state liquor laws from the protective shield of interstate com-
merce.72 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of theAct in James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway. 73
a. James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway
Clark Distilling illustrates the states' difficulty controlling the
flow of alcohol seeping through the mail order loophole created by
Rhodes. In Clark Distilling, West Virginia had successfully issued
preliminary injunctions against Western Maryland Railway, re-
straining it from shipping liquor into the state ordered by Clark
Distilling in violation of West Virginia law. 4 West Virginia
charged that very large shipments were taking place contrary to the
laws governing solicitation and use of liquor in the state. Clark
Distilling sued the railway demanding it take a shipment of liquor
that it asserted, disingenuously, was for personal use.7 6 At trial, the
State produced evidence showing that Clark Distilling had system-
atically solicited purchases, and constantly shipped liquor from Ma-
ryland into West Virginia in violation of the prohibition law.77
In Clark Distilling, the Supreme Court considered, among other
things, whether Congress had the power to enact the Webb-Ken-
yon Law,78 and if so, did Congress intend for the Law to extend as
far as West Virginia's enactment, in prohibiting interstate ship-
ments destined for personal use.79 As to the first question, the
Court concluded unequivocally that Congress had the power to en-
act the Webb-Kenyon Law, and that its passage was a lawful dele-
gation of the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce
70. Spaeth, supra note 25, at 173.
71. James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 321 (1917).
72. Id. at 324.
73. Id. at 330-32.
74. Id. at 317.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 317-18 (emphasis added). At the time of the injunction West Virginia's
law did not prohibit personal consumption of liquor only its manufacture and sale. By
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however, West Virginia had amended
its laws to prohibit personal use as well. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 325.
79. Id. at 321.
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with respect to liquor."0 As to how far Congress intended Webb-
Kenyon to reach, the Court looked to "[t]he antecedents of the
Webb-Kenyon Act, that is, its legislative and judicial progeni-
tors,"'" and concluded there was no doubt the purpose of the Act
was to address the "great evil which was asserted to arise from the
right to ship liquor into a state through the channels of interstate
commerce, and to receive and sell the same in the original package,
in violation of state prohibitions. '8 2 The Court concluded the
Webb-Kenyon Act removed the Commerce Clause immunity that
had shielded interstate liquor shipments from the reach of local
law. 3
The holding in Clark Distilling empowered the prohibitionists,
allowing a crescendo of prohibitionist sentiment to build as activist
organizations such as the Prohibition Party, the Anti-Saloon
League, and the Women's Christian Temperance Union picked up
political support.84 By 1919, these groups proved so successful that
over thirty-three states had enacted "dry laws" restricting local li-
quor traffic. Prohibition was dawning.
B. Prohibition, Repeal, and The Twenty-First Amendment
The "Noble Experiment"86 born by the passage of the Eight-
eenth Amendment8 7 to the Constitution was, from the beginning,
the triumph of hope over reality. The weakness of Prohibition was
apparent immediately after the Amendment's ratification., One
of the primary weaknesses was that it did not prohibit the con-
sumption or use of alcoholic beverages, nor did it outlaw mere pos-
session.8 9 Instead, the Amendment prohibited, "the manufacture,
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importa-
tion thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United
States." Moreover, the Amendment gave state and federal author-
ities concurrent enforcement powers. 90 Instead of encouraging
80. Id. at 328-29.
81. Id. at 323.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 324.
84. Loretto Winery Ltd. v. Gazzara, 601 F. Supp. 850, 853-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (cit-
ing F. DOBYNS, THE AMAZING STORY OF REPEAL, 229-30 (1940)).
85. Id. at 854
86. Id. at 856 n.7 ("President Herbert Hoover, who had some difficulty in deciding
whether he was a Wet or a Dry, coined this expression for National Prohibition.").
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
88. Loretto Winery Ltd., 601 F. Supp. at 854.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 856.
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greater enforcement, it had the opposite effect, by giving the states
a convenient excuse to let the federal authorities bear the primary
burden of enforcing what was obviously an unpopular law.91 The
federal government, for its part, removed Prohibition enforcement
from its regular agencies and assigned special agents who were un-
derpaid and prone to corruption.92
At the same time, demand for alcoholic beverages actually in-
creased after Prohibition, partly because of public fascination with
something forbidden yet widely available in the flourishing night
clubs and speakeasies of the 1920s.93 One estimate put the number
of speakeasies in the United States at 219,000 by 1929, and 32,000
of these were in New York City alone.94 Even the family doctor
became involved in dispensing alcoholic beverages-an exception
to the Amendment allowed alcohol for "medicinal purposes."95
Adding to the loopholes was the exception for sacramental wine.
Soon it seemed the United States had become a nation of bootleg-
gers. 96 "Home brew" was widespread, and people began to associ-
ate alcohol consumption as a symbol of freedom from senseless
government regulation.97 In contemporary slang, the phrase
"Strike a blow for freedom" became a "euphemism for pouring a
drink."98
With widespread violation and flaunting of the law, the seem-
ingly unending supply of liquor, and the poor prospects for en-
forcement, the political mood began to swing toward repeal.99
After thirteen years, the "Noble Experiment" ended on December
5, 1933 with the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment. The
Twenty-First Amendment met with universal celebration, as states
welcomed regaining local control of liquor laws and enforce-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 855.
94. Id. (citing F.W. BOARD, JR., America and the Jazz Age. A History of the 1920's,
71 (1968)).
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also Nat'l Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms, 626 F.2d 997, 999 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
When a dealer sells outside of its authorized territory, it is called in industry
parlance a 'bootlegger' or 'highjacker.' This is considered unethical business
practice. Where the term 'bootlegger' appears in the rest of this opinion ...
it is used in the more ordinary sense to mean a seller of illicit alcohol.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
97. Loretto Winery Ltd., 601 F. Supp. at 855.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 856.
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ment.'00 The Amendment originally had four sections. The first
section provided for repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, and the
fourth section dealt with ratification by the states. 10 1 In contrast to
their benign brothers, sections two and three were quite
controversial. 102
The proposed section three gave concurrent power to the federal
and state governments to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages
for on-premises consumption.'0 3 This provision caused concern
about preserving a federal role in local law enforcement. 0 4 Given
the recent experience during Prohibition, there was a feeling that
this provision defeated the whole point of repeal.'0 5 Congress ulti-
mately deleted section three in favor of giving the states complete
control of alcohol regulation.'0 6
The proposed section two was retained. In Craig v. Boren, the
Supreme Court attempted to interpret the provision: "The wording
of § 2 . . . closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts, ex-
pressing the framers' clear intention of constitutionalizing the
Commerce Clause framework established under those statutes.' 0 7
Clear intentions aside, section two has continued to fuel debate as
to what exactly Congress intended, as well as how to reconcile dif-
ferences in interpretation. 10 8
100. Spaeth, supra note 25, at 180.
101. Id.
102. Id. n.128 (citing S.J. Res. 211, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 76 CONG REc 4138, 41.39
(1933)). The original proposal read:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed.
Sec. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or posses-
sion of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 3. Congress shall have concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the sale
of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold.
Sec. 4. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as
provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submis-
sion hereof to the States by the Congress.
Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 180.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976).
108. Spaeth, supra note 25, at 180-81.
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C. The Three-Tier System After Prohibition
Many states were eager to regain control of alcoholic beverage
regulation after Prohibition. States often responded in one of two
ways - state monopoly of the distribution chain or the three-tier
system,10 9 with most states opting for some form of the three-tier
system.110 The states chose the three-tier system to address
problems associated with what were known as "tied houses." '111
In the early days after prohibition's repeal, there were few laws
regulating the alcoholic beverage industry.' 1 2 One of the perceived
dangers before Prohibition was vertical integration in the liquor
industry by so-called "tied houses."' 13 This referred to large manu-
facturers and distillers able to control the entire distribution pro-
cess from production down to the neighborhood bar. The direct
control of retailers by producers was believed to lead to increased
sales, abusive sales practices, and excessive consumption. " 4
Before prohibition, distillers and brewers had gained control of
large numbers of retailers. 1 5 Some believed that many of the pre-
Prohibition alcohol problems were directly linked to the evils of
"tied houses," and that steps should be taken in the new era to
prevent this.116 One example cited in Congressional testimony de-
scribed a system where retailers controlled by large distillers had a
quota to fill of a particular private brand as a condition to being
109. TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 202 (4th Cir. 2001) (considering an ac-
tion in which a liquor retailer challenged Maryland's scheme for regulating wholesale
liquor in violation of the Sherman Act, noting that, "The Twenty-First Amendment
repealed Prohibition in 1933 and gave the states wide latitude to regulate liquor distri-
bution and sales within their borders," and further stating that, "Two methods of reg-
ulation have emerged. The first is the operation of a state monopoly on liquor sales
with state-run stores. The second is a licensing system that grants licenses to those in
the liquor distribution chain, namely, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, who
must operate under detailed regulations.").
110. Heald v. Engler, No. 00-CV-71438-DT, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826, at *3
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2001) (noting that "In one form or another, the three-tier distri-
bution system is in place in most states" (citing Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d
1306, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2001))); Shanker, supra note 25, at 355 ("After Prohibition,
most states adopted the 'three-tier system' of alcohol sales, under which alcohol pro-
ducers must go through wholesalers and distributors, who must in turn go through
retailers, who can then sell to consumers.").
111. Nat'l Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 626 F.2d
997, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
112. Id. at 1005.
113. Id. at 1008-10.
114. Id. at 1009.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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allowed to retail that particular brand.'17 Retailers were thus en-
couraged to induce customers to continue drinking when they
clearly had enough." 8
Many states chose the three-tier system to address the perceived
dangers of "tied houses" by separating the producers from con-
sumers through a distinct and mandatory distribution system. 1 9
Today, for the most part, the three-tier system continues to
prevail.' 20
D. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Although Commerce Clause jurisprudence dates back even fur-
ther than the Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments, the mod-
ern application is relatively recent, widely accepted, and involves a
two-tier analysis.12' This two-tier analysis was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Authority.22
Justice Thurgood Marshal, writing for the Court, spelled out the
first tier of the analysis: "When a state statute directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to
favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interest; [the Su-
preme Court has] generally struck down the statute without further
inquiry.' 1 23 As the language indicates, this tends to be a strict rule.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., S.A. Discount Liquor, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 709
F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[T]o avoid the harmful effects of vertical integration in
the intoxicants industry, the state has effectively restricted manufacturers, wholesal-
ers ... and retailers to one level of activity."); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397,
425 (E.D. Va. 2002) (explaining one of the general principles underlying Virginia's
ABC laws was to "minimize private profit and discouraging sales and consumption by
p'eventing integration among manufacturers from holding interest in retailers").
120. Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2001), vacated by
Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
[L]ike the majority of states, Florida utilizes a three-tiered system of alcohol
distribution, with different classes of licenses for manufacturers, distributers,
and retailers. In conjunction with this distribution system, it is unlawful for
any person in the business of selling alcoholic beverages to knowingly ship
alcoholic beverages from an out-of-state location directly to any person in
this state who does not hold a valid manufacturer's or wholesaler's license.
121. See Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (explaining the Supreme Court's two-tier
approach in analyzing state economic regulation).
122. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986).
123. Id. at 573; see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 n.14 (1989) (quoting
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579, and striking down price affirmation
statutes).
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The second tier analysis applies a balancing test when there is an
indirect interference or burden to interstate commerce, but the
regulation is not facially discriminatory, allowing it to survive tier
one scrutiny. 124 In such an instance, courts do not strike the regula-
tion out of hand, but instead, attempt to weigh certain factors.125
There are numerous scholarly interpretations as well as court opin-
ions on this aspect of the Commerce Clause, but the most widely
accepted summary126 of the law comes from the United States Su-
preme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. :127
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state stat-
utes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated,
the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where
the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate lo-
cal public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. Occasionally
the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in
resolving these issues, but more frequently it has spoken in
terms of 'direct' and 'indirect' effects and burdens. 28
Another broad area of modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence
is implicated when a state itself acts as a market participant. 129 In
those situations, the state is acting in the capacity of a private mar-
ket participant, not as a market regulator. 30 A state that owns a
business and favors its own citizens is generally free from the re-
straints of the dormant Commerce Clause. 31 The market partici-
pant doctrine, however, is not infinite. Whether a state's use or
124. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579 ("When, however, a statute
has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have
examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on inter-
state commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits." (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970))).
125. Id.
126. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, § 8.7.
127. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
128. Id. (internal citations onitted).
129. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, § 8.9.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (hold-
ing that state bounty for scrap automobiles can favor scrap processors with an in-state
plant)).
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regulation of its own natural or financial resources constitutes a
permissible protection of local interests while acting as a "market
participant," or is an impermissible favoring of in-state economic
interests, is sometimes unclear. 132 The Supreme Court analyzed
this distinction in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke.133
In South-Central Timber, Alaska had imposed a requirement
that state-owned timber sold under contract had to be processed
in-state before shipment out of state. The plurality decision con-
cluded that the state could not exercise "downstream regulations"
and limit market activity even regarding its own natural resource
once the resource was sold. 34 The Court narrowly interpreted the
meaning of market participant to encompass only the raw timber
business. 135 The next stage of processing, in the Court's opinion,
was a totally distinct line of business. 36 Hence, Alaska could not
escape Commerce Clause scrutiny. 37 Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor dissented, arguing that the state was acting as a market
participant, and the economic reality was that Alaska was offering
a lower price for the raw timber to keep processing jobs in-state.131
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has experienced a "long and
twisted" path on its way to modern application.139 Although it is
widely accepted that the dormant Commerce Clause is meant to
prevent the "economic Balkanization of the Union," the role of the
Court and what tests it should apply to achieve these goals has not
always been clearly scripted. 4 ° Moreover, as Professors Nowak
and Rotunda explain, "Commerce Clause analysis must also ex-
plain why Congress can, in effect, overrule a Court decision based
on the Commerce Clause, when Congress enacts legislation that
discriminates against interstate commerce, or approves of discrimi-
natory state laws.' 4'Finally, where state regulations are found to have either a dis-
criminatory purpose or effect on interstate commerce, in violation
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing South-Cent. Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 103.
139. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, § 8.1.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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of the Commerce Clause or the dormant Commerce Clause, the
regulations are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.1 4 2
E. Commerce and The Twenty-First Amendment: The Early
Supreme Court Cases
1. State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's
Market Co.
In the years immediately following Prohibition's repeal, the Su-
preme Court gave the Twenty-First Amendment a fairly wide
berth.143 An expansive reading of the Twenty-First Amendment
was expressed early on in State Board of Equalization of California
v. Young's Market Co.144 In Young's Market, California had im-
posed a five hundred dollar license fee for the privilege of import-
ing beer to any place within its borders. 45 The plaintiffs were
California wholesalers who imported beer from Missouri and Wis-
consin for resale in California. 146 Each refused to apply for the
import license, claiming the regulation discriminated against
wholesalers of imported beer and violated the dormant Commerce
Clause and Equal Protection clause. 47 The Supreme Court made a
point to note this was not a case involving the privilege to sell beer,
since all plaintiffs possessed a fifty dollar license to sell lawfully
possessed beer, whether imported or not. 48 The plaintiffs were
complaining about having to pay for the privilege of importing
beer.14 9
Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, grounded his decision
squarely on the Twenty-First Amendment and upheld the Califor-
nia import fee against the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. 150
Justice Brandeis noted that before the passage of the Twenty-First
Amendment it would have been unconstitutional for California to
have imposed any fee for the privilege of importing alcoholic bev-
erages.15' Even if California imposed an equal fee for the privilege
142. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd., v. Branson, 82 F. Supp. 2d 844, 863 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (citing Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984)).
143. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, § 8.8; Foust, supra note 36, at 677-89;
Miller, supra note 31, at 2512-23.
144. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
145. Id. at 60.
146. Id. at 60-61.
147. Id. at 61.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 62.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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of transporting domestic beer from the place of manufacture to the
wholesaler, the law would have been unconstitutional not because
of discrimination, but because of an impermissible burden on inter-
state commerce. 152 Justice Brandeis concluded, however, that the
Twenty-First Amendment "abrogated the right to import free, so
far as concerns intoxicating liquors."' 153 In effect, Justice Brandeis
was saying that after the Twenty-First Amendment, the Commerce
Clause could no longer constrain the states from freely regulating
alcoholic imports.
Finally, in an argument that may resonate with the current de-
bate on direct wine shipments, the Court held that the Twenty-First
Amendment empowered the states to forbid all imports that did
not comply with state regulations. 154 Extending the argument, Jus-
tice Brandeis wrote:
The plaintiffs ask us to limit this broad command. They request
us to construe the amendment as saying, in effect: The state may
prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors provided it pro-
hibits the manufacture and sale within its boarders[sic]; but if it
permits such manufacture and sale, it must let imported liquors
compete with the domestic on equal terms. To say that, would
involve not a construction of the amendment, but a rewriting of
it.155
2. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co.
Although the Court's reading of the Twenty-First Amendment in
Young's Market was indeed broad, less than two years later, the
Court held that those limits, however, were not unbounded in the
case of Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co..156
In Yosemite Park, the defendant contracted with the Secretary of
the Interior to operate hotels, camps, and stores within Yosemite
National Park.157 As part of its operations, Yosemite sold liquor,
beer, and wine to park visitors for prices approved by the Secretary
of the Interior. 5 ' During the normal course of business, Yosemite
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 538 (1938) (concluding
that the Twenty-First Amendment, while increasing the states' power to deal with
liquor regulation, did not increase the states' jurisdiction and therefore the Twenty-
First Amendment did not enable California to regulate liquor at Yosemite Park which
was under the territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
157. Id. at 521.
158. Id.
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also imported beer, wine, and distilled spirits from outside Califor-
nia, and stored it on premises in anticipation of sale. 159 Fresh from
victory in Young's Market, California tried to impose its ABC laws
on Yosemite by levying liquor import and sale taxes and fees under
the threat of civil and criminal penalties. 160 Yosemite sued to en-
join California from acting on its threat.161
The Supreme Court held for the plaintiffs and explained,
"Though the [Twenty-First] Amendment may have increased the
state's power to deal with the problem [of liquor importation] it did
not increase its jurisdiction .... As territorial jurisdiction over the
Park was in the United States, the State could not legislate for the
area merely on account of the XXI Amendment.' 1 62 This doctrine
of extraterritoriality-that a state's power under the Twenty-First
Amendment is limited to its jurisdiction-is a recurring theme in
related Supreme Court cases.
3. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corporation
The broad interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment seems
to have prevailed after Young's Market and Yosemite Park until
1964, when the Court decided the oft-quoted case of Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corporation.63 Although Hostetter is
often cited by commentators to show the pendulum swing from the
broad to the narrow reading of the Twenty-First Amendment, the
holding, in light of the facts, should not be too surprising or ex-
traordinary. It is simply the east coast version of Yosemite Park.
In Hostetter, Idlewild was in the business of selling bottled wines
and liquors to departing international airline passengers at Idlewild
Airport, now New York City's John F. Kennedy Airport.1 64 Only
travelers were allowed to buy liquor. 165 After a purchase, the li-
quor was delivered directly to the departing plane with documents
approved by United States Customs. 166 The passenger was not
given the liquor until arrival overseas.167 Idlewild bought the li-
quor from bonded wholesalers located outside New York State,
159. Id.
160. Id. at 522.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 538.
163. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
164. Id. at 325.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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specializing in tax-free liquors destined for export.168 The New
York State Liquor Authority informed Idlewild that it was in viola-
tion of the State's ABC laws because it was unlicensed under New
York law. 169 Idlewild sued for injunctive relief to prevent New
York from interfering with its business.170 New York argued that it
was within its Twenty-First Amendment powers to regulate this
business, and had justifiable concerns about preventing the diver-
sion of alcohol.1 7 1
The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Stewart, sus-
tained the challenge against New York.1 72 The analysis began with
the general principle that "the right of a state to prohibit or regu-
late importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the Com-
merce Clause. ' 173 After noting a number of cases supporting the
expansive reading of the Twenty-First Amendment, Justice Stewart
refined the generalization with a reminder that, nevertheless, this
power was not unlimited: "To draw a conclusion from this line of
decisions that the Twenty-First Amendment has somehow oper-
ated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of in-
toxicating liquors is concerned would, however, be an absurd
oversimplification.' 1 74 The Court stated that both the Twenty-First
Amendment and the Commerce Clause were parts of the same
Constitution, and "each must be considered in light of the other,
and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any con-
168. Id.
169. Id. at 326. The opinion of the New York Attorney General was based on the
following provisions of New York law:
Sale means any transfer, exchange or barter in any manner or by any means
whatsoever for a consideration, and includes and means all sales made by
any person, whether principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee of any
alcoholic beverage and/or a warehouse receipt pertaining thereto.
N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 3 (McKinney 2003).
No person shall manufacture for sale or sell at wholesale or retail any alco-
holic beverage within the state without obtaining the appropriate license
therefore required by this chapter.
Id. § 100.
No premises shall be licensed to sell liquors and/or wines at retail for off
premises consumption, unless said premises shall be located in a store, the
entrance to which shall be from the street level and located on a public thor-
oughfare in premises which may be occupied, operated or conducted for
business, trade or industry or on an arcade or subsurface thoroughfare lead-
ing to a railroad terminal.
Id. § 105.
170. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 326-27.
171. Id. at 328.
172. Id. at 334.
173. Id. at 330.
174. Id. at 331-332.
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crete case.' 1 75 In illustrating what was meant by this balancing of
dual clauses with facts, Justice Stewart referred to the rationale be-
hind the Yosemite Park decision-extraterritoriality.
In addition to finding that New York had reached beyond its ju-
risdiction, the Hostetter Court also found that New York had
"neither alleged nor proved the diversion of so much as one bottle
of plaintiff's merchandise to users within the state of New York."1 76
The ultimate delivery and use was not in New York, but a foreign
country. The Court concluded that "the State has sought totally to
prevent transactions carried on under the aegis of a law passed by
Congress in the exercise of its explicit power under the Constitu-
tion to regulate commerce with foreign nations. This New York
cannot constitutionally do."' 77
Distilled to its essentials, Hostetter is simply a variation of
Yosemite Park. A state has increased power to regulate liquor, but
not increased jurisdiction.1 78 Federal laws specifically setting up
the duty free shops and the security provisions preventing unlawful
diversion into the State created a federal enclave like the national
park in Yosemite Park, an enclave to which the power of the
Twenty-First Amendment did not extend.
On the same day Hostetter was decided, the Supreme Court also
decided Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling,179
which further defined the jurisdictional limits of the Twenty-First
Amendment. In Beam Distilling, the Court considered the rela-
tionship between the Export-Import Clause'80 and the Twenty-First
Amendment. Consistent with the theme in Hostetter that the juris-
dictional reach of the Twenty-First Amendment is not unbounded,
the Court limited the states' ability to tax liquor imports from
abroad "because of the explicit and precise words of the Export-
Import Clause of the Constitution.' 1 81 The Court thereby subordi-
175. Id. at 332.
176. Id. at 328.
177. Id. at 333.
178. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 538 (1938) (finding that
"though the [Twenty-First] Amendment may have increased the state's power to deal
with the problem; it did not increases its jurisdiction." (internal quotes omitted)).
179. 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 provides that:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Du-
ties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts,
laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury
of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and
Controul of the Congress.
181. Beam Distilling, 377 U.S. at 346.
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nated the Twenty-First Amendment's power to foreign policy con-
cerns that are present as to imports from abroad as well. 112
The theme of extraterritoriality and the principle that a state
cannot extend the reach of its Twenty-First Amendment powers
beyond its jurisdiction is not anchored merely to geography. What
the Court began in Beam Distilling, it further refined in Craig v.
Boren"s3 by considering the relationship of the Twenty-First
Amendment to the Bill of Rights.
4. Craig v. Boren
Craig v. Boren involved an action challenging Oklahoma statutes
that "prohibit[ed] the sale of 'nonintoxicating' 3.2% beer to males
under age 21 and to females under age 18.11184 The plaintiffs al-
leged that gender-based discrimination constituted a denial of
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment."8 ' The Court
invalidated the Oklahoma statutes, noting:
Once passing beyond consideration of the Commerce Clause,
the relevance of the Twenty-First Amendment to other constitu-
tional provisions becomes increasingly doubtful. As one com-
mentator has remarked: 'Neither the text nor the history of the
Twenty-First Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual
rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment where the sale or use of liquor is concerned."186
Craig v. Boren articulated what the Court had been saying all
along, from Yosemite Park to Hostetter and Beam Distilling; that is,
the power of the Twenty-First Amendment falls sharply once its
reach extends outside the scope of the Commerce Clause. Al-
though this guidance was helpful, it nevertheless did not address
how strong that power was when the issue fell inside the scope of
the Commerce Clause. In the next series of cases, the contours of
the modern approach to balancing the competing interests of the
Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause were molded.
182. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, § 8.8.
183. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 192.
185. Id. at 191.
186. Id. at 206 (quoting P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAK-
ING, CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (1975)).
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F. A Pragmatic Approach to Balancing the Federal Interests:
More From the Supreme Court
1. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.
Justice Powell took the opportunity to summarize the history of
Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence in the 1980 case of Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.187
Midcal held that, notwithstanding a state's virtually complete
power to control the importation, sale, or distribution of liquor,
Congress had the power, under the Commerce Clause, to prohibit
resale price maintenance, which violates the Sherman Act.' 88 The
Midcal opinion concluded that the tension between the Twenty-
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause would find no easy
resolution because "there is no bright line between federal and
state powers over liquor.' 1 89 The Court went on to note that while
the "States retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor
regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal commerce
power in appropriate situations. The competing state and federal
interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those con-
cerns in a concrete case."' 90 Essentially, every case is a judgment
call involving a balancing act. Moreover, this balancing was to be a
"pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal power."191 Before
the Midcal decade drew to a close, the Supreme Court demon-
strated its pragmatic balancing in a series of cases that laid the
foundation for the current debate on direct shipment laws.
2. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp
In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp192 the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether Oklahoma could require cable television opera-
tors to delete all advertisements for alcoholic beverages contained
in the out-of-state signals retransmitted to Oklahoma subscrib-
ers. 1 93 Illustrating the pragmatic approach, the Court held that
Oklahoma could not. 194
187. 445 U.S. 97, 106-110 (1980).
188. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 18, § 8.8.
189. 445 U.S. at 110.
190. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
191. Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
192. 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
193. Id. at 694.
194. Id. at 716.
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The decision in Capital Cities rested on two considerations. First,
the Court recognized that the Federal Communications Commision
("FCC") had an interest in the case because it raised questions as
to "whether the State's regulation of liquor advertising, as applied
to out-of-state broadcast signals, was valid in light of existing fed-
eral regulations of cable broadcasting. ' 195
The FCC filed an amicus brief in which it contended that the
Oklahoma ban on the retransmission of out-of-state signals by
cable companies would significantly interfere "with the existing
federal regulatory framework established to promote cable broad-
casting."'196 Expanding its inquiry, the Court wrote: "Although we
do not ordinarily consider questions not specifically passed upon
by the lower court, this rule is not inflexible, particularly in cases
coming, as this one does, from the federal courts. '197 The Court
apparently realized that upholding Oklahoma's ban would signifi-
cantly disrupt a host of FCC regulations, with consequences well
beyond Oklahoma's borders. In addition, the Court noted that the
practical implication of such a ban "would be prohibitively
burdensome." 98
The second element was Oklahoma's own narrow interest here
- the ban did "not apply to alcoholic beverage advertisements ap-
pearing in newspapers, magazines, and other publications printed
outside Oklahoma but sold and distributed in the State." 19 9 In ef-
fect, Oklahoma already allowed alcoholic beverage advertisements
in nearly all other media entering the state. Hence, banning the
retransmission of cable broadcasts alone would address only a sin-
gle avenue of alcohol advertising, allowing all other forms to con-
tinue unfettered. Weighing this narrow state interest along with
the significant interests of the FCC, the Court held Oklahoma's
prohibition unconstitutional.20 The Court's decision in Capital
Cities was unanimous, unlike in the next important case, which one
commentator called arguably the most important modern case in
Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence.2"'
195. Id. at 697.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 707.
199. Id. at 695.
200. Id. at 716 (holding that the application of Oklahoma's alcoholic beverage ad-
vertising ban to out-of-state cable operators in that State is pre-empted by federal law
and that the Twenty-First Amendment does not save the regulation from pre-
emption).
201. Foust, supra note 36, at 682 n.150 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-27, at 1170 (3rd ed. 2000), when calling Bacchus perhaps
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3. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias2°2 the Supreme Court struck
down a Hawaii statute that levied a twenty-percent tax on whole-
sale liquor sales but exempted certain locally produced liquor.20 3
The Hawaiian tax, as originally enacted in 1939, contained no ex-
ceptions.20 4 But in 1971, the legislature exempted Okolehao, a
brandy distilled from the root of an indigenous Hawaiian shrub, in
an effort to aid the local liquor industry. 0 5 A few years later, the
State exempted pineapple wine.20 6 Other locally produced sake
(Japanese rice wine) and fruit liqueurs were not exempted from the
tax.
207
Bacchus is an important decision for opponents of direct-ship-
ping laws, because its reasoning provides much ammunition to use
against the states. The Supreme Court began its analysis stating:
"A cardinal rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that no
State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may impose a tax
which discriminates against interstate commerce by providing a di-
rect commercial advantage to local business. °208
Hawaii attempted to minimize the extent of the harm by relying
on statistics showing that the sales of okolehao and pineapple wine
constituted well under one percent of the total liquor sales in Ha-
waii. 09 The State further argued that these two types of indige-
nous wines posed "no competitive threat to other liquors produced
elsewhere and consumed in Hawaii. 210
The Court made short shrift of these arguments by concluding,
"Neither the small volume of sales of exempted liquor nor the fact
that the exempted liquors do not constitute a present 'competitive
threat' to other liquors is dispositive of the question whether com-
petition exists between the locally produced beverages and foreign
beverages."'2 1' The Court noted that it "need not know how une-
the most important of the contemporary cases on the scope of the Twenty-First
Amendment).
202. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
203. Id. at 265.
204. Id. at 265.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 268.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 269.
211. Id.
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qual the Tax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally
discriminates. 212
The Court also foreclosed the argument that Bacchus could be
distinguished as merely a taxpayer discrimination case thereby not
implicating the Commerce Clause. Even if it were only a taxpayer
discrimination case the Court said, "Our cases make clear that dis-
crimination between in-state and out-of-state goods is as offensive
to the Commerce Clause as discrimination between in-state and
out-of-state taxpayers. "213
Hawaii asked the Supreme Court to apply a "more flexible ap-
proach, taking into account the practical effect and relative burden
on commerce." 214 The State argued that legitimate state objectives
were credibly advanced, there was no patent discrimination against
interstate trade, and the effect on interstate commerce was inciden-
tal.215 The Court responded that a finding of "economic protec-
tionism may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose
or discriminatory effect. '2 16 In light of the obvious and self-admit-
ted protectionist genesis of the tax, the Court found "it had both
the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of local
products. "217
The final part of Bacchus addresses the weight given to the
Twenty-First Amendment. 2t8 The analysis demonstrated the Su-
preme Court's balancing in favor of the dormant Commerce
Clause. Citing Midcal, the Court admitted that its "recent Twenty-
First Amendment cases emphasized federal interests to a greater
degree than had earlier cases" while attempting to employ a "prag-
matic effort to harmonize state and federal powers. "219
One reason the majority, after examining all the factors, gave
relatively less weight to the Twenty-First Amendment is explained
in the Bacchus opinion,220 where the Court noted that "the State
expressly disclaimed any reliance upon the Twenty-First Amend-
ment in the court below and did not cite it in its motion to dismiss
or affirm."' 221 The Court further chided the State that only when
212. Id. (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981)).
213. Id. at 269 n.8 (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 270.
215. Id.
216. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
217. Id. at 273.
218. Id. at 274-76.
219. Id. at 275.
220. Id. at 274.
221. Id.
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the State had to prepare for argument before the Supreme Court
did it become "clear" that the Twenty-First Amendment saved the
challenged tax.222 It may be that the Court, in its pragmatic ap-
proach, simply recognized that the State itself did not rely on the
Twenty-First Amendment in justifying the challenged statute.
Whether or not Hawaii argued the issue of whether the Twenty-
First Amendment shielded the tax from a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge, the issue was the focus of the opinion. Although Bacchus
passed with a 5-3 majority,223 the dissent by Justice Stevens, joined
by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, emphatically disagreed with
the light weight the majority placed on the Twenty-First Amend-
ment in reaching its decision.224 Disagreeing with the majority's
finding that the Hawaiian tax was unconstitutional, Justice Stevens
wrote, "[a]s I read the text of the Amendment, it expressly autho-
rizes this sort of burden. '225 Justice Stevens buttressed his argu-
ment by noting that Hawaii clearly had the power under the
Twenty-First Amendment to prohibit all imports of liquor into the
state or use therein.2 6 Thus, he reasoned, if Hawaii had the power
to create a local monopoly - thereby creating the most severe
form of discrimination on out-of-state interests - it logically had
the power to choose a much lesser form of discrimination by pro-
viding some degree of special benefits in the form of a subsidy or
tax exemption for locally produced liquor.2 27
The struggle to find the proper balance between the Twenty-First
Amendment and other federal interests implicating the Commerce
Clause was evident in the Bacchus opinion. Justice Stevens' dissent
clearly identifies the two camps within the Court and sounds what
will be a consistent theme throughout the following decade by
those Justices who believe the power of the Twenty-First Amend-
ment has been wrongfully mitigated.
4. Brown Forman Distillers Corp. and Healy
Toward the end of the 1980s, the Court rounded out its Twenty-
First Amendment jurisprudence with Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority,22 and Healy v. The Beer
222. Id.
223. Id. at 277 (Brennan, J. not participating in the decision).
224. Id. at 278-87.
225. Id. at 282.
226. Id. at 285.
227. Id. at 286.
228. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
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Institute.2 2 9 Both cases stand for the principle that the Twenty-First
Amendment cannot withstand a challenge from the Commerce
Clause when the practical effect is to regulate liquor sales or trans-
actions in other states.2 3° These holdings are not surprising; they
echo the principle of extraterritoriality and its role in limiting the
reach of the Twenty-First Amendment. In addition, Brown-For-
man Distillers is noteworthy as a cornerstone case in modern dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis, as it firmly established the "two-
tiered approach" the Supreme Court began to take in analyzing
state economic regulation under the Commerce Clause. 3 1
Healy was similar to Brown-Forman in that it too addressed
Connecticut's price affirmation statutes, which operated indirectly,
as opposed to the direct effect in Brown-Forman. The Supreme
Court struck down the Connecticut regulations largely on the same
grounds it did in Brown-Forman, prohibiting laws that effectively
regulated liquor sales in other states.232 The Court echoed the
same theme of extraterritoriality first expressed a half century ear-
lier in Yosemite Park.33
Finally, in concluding the Supreme Court cases, like Bacchus, the
Brown-Forman and Healy decisions are noteworthy for their dis-
sent. Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
White. 34 The dissent was grounded on two points; the first of
which was the lack of evidence showing that the challenged statute
really had any impact on price competition outside New York's
borders. 235 The second point of the dissent echoed the Bacchus
dissent, arguing that the Twenty-First Amendment empowered
New York to totally exclude liquor from its local market if it chose
229. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
230. Healy, 491 U.S. at 342-43 (affirming the holding in Brown-Forman that the
Twenty-First Amendment does not immunize state laws from invalidation under the
Commerce Clause when those laws have the practical effect of regulating liquor sales
in other states); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 585 (holding New York's
statute regulated out-of-state transactions in violation of the Commerce Clause, and
the statute was not a valid exercise of New York's powers under the Twenty-First
Amendment).
231. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579 ("This Court has adopted what
amounts to a two-tiered approach to analyzing state economic regulation under the
Commerce Clause."); see also supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
232. Healy, 491 U.S. at 343.
233. Id. (striking down Connecticut's price affirmation statutes for "the reasons
noted today and in Brown-Forman, this extraterritorial effect violates the Commerce
Clause"); see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
234. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 586-92.
235. Id. at 587.
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to do so. 236 Like the dissent in Bacchus, Justice Stevens argued
that the greater power to limit imports entirely implied a lesser
power to regulate imports in this fashion, and that the Twenty-First
Amendment should be given a much wider berth.237
Healy was decided in 1989, three years after Brown-Forman.
Once again as in Bacchus, Craig v. Boren, and Brown-Forman,
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, this time joined by Justices Ste-
vens and O'Connor.238 The dissent, sounding a familiar theme,
contended that the majority paid only "lip service '' 239 to the princi-
ple that states are given additional authority to regulate alcoholic
beverages under the Twenty-First Amendment.24 ° Similar to the
reasoning in Judge Easterbrook's much-analyzed Bridenbaugh de-
cision, Chief Justice Rehnquist commented, "Neglecting to con-
sider that increased authority is especially disturbing here where
the perceived proscriptive force of the Commerce Clause does not
flow from an affirmative legislative decision and so is at its na-
dir." 242 The Chief Justice wrote further, "The result reached by the
Court in these cases can only be described as perverse. A proper
view of the Twenty-First Amendment would require that States
have greater latitude under the Commerce Clause to regulate
products of alcoholic beverages than they do producers of milk. '243
G. Whining Wineries: The Connoisseurs Strike Back
The tension between the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Twenty-First Amendment has fermented for decades without at-
tracting much attention. Yet, in the past three years, it seems to
have resurfaced in the courts with a renewed urgency and sense of
236. Id. at 591.
237. Id.
238. Healy, 491 U.S. at 345-349.
239. Id. at 349.
240. Id.
241. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000) ("This case
pits the twenty-first amendment, which appears in the Constitution, against the 'dor-
mant commerce clause,' which does not.").
242. Healy, 491 U.S. at 349.
243. Id.
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purpose.244 Five of the seven cases analyzed in this Note were ar-
gued in 2002.245
The combination in recent years of the rise of e-commerce, with
its promise of convenience and efficiency, changes in the structure
of the wholesale liquor industry, and the rise both in number and in
quality of wineries throughout the country go a long way in ex-
plaining why this issue has become hotly contested. According to
one commentator, "The so-called 'wine war' is a very focused ex-
ample of how people with economic, political, and personal inter-
ests can change the law in the United States. 2 46
Driving this change has been a shift in American tastes, not only
for fine wine, but often hard-to-find wine as well. In response to
consumer demand over the past decade, many wineries have con-
verted from mass produced, inexpensive wines, to specialty wines
that are not only produced in much smaller quantity but have
achieved almost cult status among a new generation of wine lovers
willing to pay almost any price.247 As an example of just how ex-
treme this love can get, one oenophile reportedly paid $500,000 for
one large bottle of 1992 Screaming Eagle Cabernet Sauvignon, the
highest recorded auction price for a single bottle of wine.248 Al-
though only a few wines ever achieve the Screaming Eagle kind of
following, the number of small, family-owned wineries has grown
dramatically over the past decade. By some estimates, while the
number of traditional liquor wholesalers has declined over the
years, from a high of twenty thousand to fewer than four hundred,
the number of wineries has expanded from under four hundred to
more than twenty-one hundred.249 Two thousand of those are
244. Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 679 n.10 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing
James Molnar, Comment, Under the Influence: Why Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws
Are a Violation of the Commerce Clause, 9 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 169, 172-74 (2001)
and explaining that a number of factors have arisen in recent years to explain the
increased challenges to direct-shipment laws, including consolidation of the liquor
wholesalers and distributors, the rise of small specialty wineries, the rise of the In-
ternet, and increased demand by wine enthusiasts).
245. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002); Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232
F. Supp. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex.
2002); Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002), affd in part, vacated
in part, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397
(E.D.Va. 2002).
246. Susan Lorde Martin, Changing the Law: Update from the Wine War, 17 J.L. &
POL. 63, 64-65. (2001).
247. Kozusko, supra note 2, at 75-76.
248. Id.
249. Lorde Martin, supra note 246, at 64.
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small, family-owned businesses.25 0 About twenty wineries make
ninety percent of all the wine produced in this country,251 so the
vast majority of the small wineries account for only about ten per-
cent of production.
These small operations do not have the benefits that economies
of scale bring to the small number of large producers. For these
wineries, the most profitable way to operate is through mail-order,
catalogue, or Internet sales.252 They do not have the resources of
the large producers to distribute their product through the tradi-
tional three-tier system. 3 By some estimates, every case of wine
sold directly to a consumer is twice as profitable to the winery than
if sold through the three-tier system.254 From the consumers' point
of view, direct purchases are convenient. Further, direct purchase
is often the only way to obtain the boutique wines a consumer
desires, since many small wineries generally cannot find wholesal-
ers to service them.2 55
The alliance of small wineries and wine connoisseurs has found
its legal voice in wine-advocacy groups such as the CFT and others
who are advancing the cause through concerted court battles.
II. THE BATTLEGROUND
A. Direct Shipment Challenges Across the Country
The United States Supreme Court has yet to hear a case on the
issue of direct shipment of wines, the battle is currently being
waged at the federal appellate and district court levels across the
country. Of the thirty states257 that prohibit direct shipments of
alcoholic beverages from out-of-state, court challenges have been
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Foust, supra note 36, at 689 (citing Interstate Alcohol Sales and the Twenty-first
Amendment: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 106th
Cong. 141, at 20 (1999) (statement of Mike Thompson, Representative for First Con-
gressional District of California)).
253. Lorde Martin, supra note 246, at 64.
254. Id. at 65.
255. Id.
256. Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (noting that
"[t]he Supreme Court has not specifically addressed state bans on direct importation
of wine, and the only appellate court to do so is the Seventh Circuit in
Bridenbaugh.").
257. Kozusko, supra note 2, at 79 (citing Clint Bolick, Wine Wars: Lift the Ban on
Out-of-State Sales, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2000, at A39).
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brought in Florida, Indiana, Michigan, New York, North Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia8
So far, the opponents of direct-shipment laws appear to have the
upper hand. Only two cases, one in Indiana and the other in Mich-
igan, have come down in favor of sustaining state direct-shipping
laws.259 Judge Easterbrook's decision in the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals is particularly notable because it was the earliest of
these cases and the first federal Court of Appeals to have consid-
ered this issue.26° The Florida case of Bainbridge v. Turner26I re-
sulted with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacating and
remanding the lower court's decision in favor of direct shipment
regulations for further determination as to whether or not Florida's
statutes sufficiently implicate core powers of the Twenty-First
Amendment to withstand a dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenge.262 The North Carolina case, initially heard before the fed-
eral district court for the Western District of North Carolina in
April of 2002, was appealed by the defendants after the court held
that North Carolina's ABC laws on direct shipment were unconsti-
tutional.263 On April 8, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, affirmed the district court's finding that North Car-
olina's ABC laws constituted an unconstitutional violation of the
Commerce Clause by discriminating between instate and out-of-
state wine shipments.264
All other district court cases have, in varying degrees, held for
the plaintiffs and declared ABC laws regulating direct shipment
258. In addition, a recent case, Mt. Hood Beverage Co. v. Constellation Brands,
Inc., 63 P.3d 779, 782 (Wash. 2003), although not involving direct-shipment per se,
closely parallels the issues involved. In Mt. Hood, the issue was whether local ABC
laws governing wholesaler agreements favored in-state interests over out-of-state eco-
nomic interests. Id. at 783. The Supreme Court of Washington, sitting en banc, held
the local regulation unconstitutional in violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 786-
87.
259. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding Indi-
ana statutes prohibiting out-of-state shipments of alcoholic beverages direct to Indi-
ana consumers).
260. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 848.
261. 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
262. Id. at 1115-16.
263. Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002), affd in part and
vacated in part, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003).
264. Beskind, 325 F.3d at 520 (affirming "the district court's conclusion that North
Carolina's ABC laws unconstitutionally discriminate against out-of-state wine manu-
facturers and sellers and vacating its remedy striking down the core provisions of
North Carolina's direct-shipment prohibitions").
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unconstitutional, the latest being Judge Berman's, November 2002,
decision in the New York case of Swedenberg v. Kelly.265
B. On Common Ground
With minor variation, these cases have a common fact pattern.
They involve states with ABC laws governing alcoholic beverages
through a three-tier system. Out-of-state shippers are generally
prohibited from shipping directly to in-state consumers, while in-
state wineries are exempt from the same restrictions. Although
plaintiffs occasionally bring suits grounded on other theories,266
these cases have all based their primary complaints on violations of
the dormant Commerce Clause. 67
C. Four Pragmatic Approaches
In the seven cases discussed in this Note, four different ap-
proaches emerge as individual courts struggle to resolve the consti-
tutionality of direct-shipping laws. While most courts have chosen
to exercise some kind of balancing, as in Brown-Forman, and Bruce
265. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that New
York's direct-shipping ban constituted an impermissible violation of the Commerce
Clause).
266. Id. at 139 (noting plaintiffs contend direct-shipment bans violate both the
Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States
Constitution).
267. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000) ("This case
pits the twenty-first amendment, which appears in the Constitution, against the 'dor-
mant Commerce Clause,' which does not."); Swedenburg, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 136
("This case is one of a series of recent constitutional challenges to state alcoholic
beverage control laws, particularly as they relate to the direct shipment of wine. What
the cases all have in common is the relationship (and tension) between the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution ... and the Twenty-first Amendment.").
Plaintiffs also argued violation of Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1105-06 ("This case im-
plicates the tension between the 'dormant' aspect of the Commerce Clause and the
Twenty-first Amendment." (citations omitted)); Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d
673, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2002) ("[T]his Court reached the conclusion[that the] Texas Alco-
holic Beverage Code Ann. § 107.07 (a) and (J. . . facially violated the Commerce
Clause of the federal constitution."); Beskind, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 466 ("Plaintiffs chal-
lenge several provisions of North Carolina's alcoholic beverage control ('ABC') sys-
tem as unconstitutional violations of the Commerce Clause, and seek declaratory and
injunctive relief."); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 402 (E.D.Va. 2002) ("In
this case, deciding whether one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law re-
quires the Court to determine ... whether certain of Virginia's ABC statutes violate
the dormant Commerce Clause."); Heald v. Engler, No. 00-CV-71438-DT, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24826, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2001) rev'd, remanded, No. 01-2720,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17965 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2003) ("Plaintiffs argue that this statu-
tory scheme discriminates against out-of-state wineries, and interferes with the free
flow of commerce, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.").
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Church,268 their conclusions vary significantly because of the differ-
ing judgments as to the proper weight of the conflicting interests.
1. The Easterbrook Approach
The most controversial approach among these cases is that taken
by Judge Easterbrook in Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson.269 Rep-
resenting one side of the emerging circuit split, this is the only fed-
eral Court of Appeals case that has upheld the constitutionality of
direct-shipment laws. The other decisions covered in this Note
were argued after Bridenbaugh - so courts had the benefit that
opinion as well as the surrounding commentary - and there was
certainly no shortage of surrounding commentary. Judge Melinda
Harmon's opinion in Dickerson v. Bailey,270 for example, actually
devotes more words and pages to the analysis of Judge Easter-
brook's opinion than Judge Easterbrook's opinion itself contained.
Judge Easterbrook's approach is noteworthy in several other re-
spects. The very first sentence of the opinion reveals his direction:
"This case pits the twenty-first amendment, which appears in the
Constitution, against the 'dormant commerce clause,' which does
not."'2 7t This is the essence of Easterbrook's approach: Section
Two of the Twenty-First Amendment should be given significant
weight because of its explicit expression in the actual text of the
Constitution. The states have plenary power to regulate liquor im-
ports, and "[n]o decision of the Supreme Court holds or implies
that laws limited to the importation of liquor are problematic
under the dormant commerce clause. '272
The opinion acknowledges Brown-Forman and Bacchus, but
only as citations to support the contention that "the greater power
to forbid imports does not imply a lesser power to allow imports on
discriminatory terms. "273 In stark contrast to other approaches, the
Easterbrook opinion cites Brown-Forman without raising the two-
tier Commerce Clause analysis.274
268. See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text (reflecting the commonly ac-
cepted two-tier Commerce Clause analysis).
269. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 848 (upholding the constitutionality of Indiana's di-
rect-shipping ban against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge).
270. Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 679-86.
271. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 849.
272. Id. at 853.
273. Id.
274. Id. (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573 (1986), to stand for the principle that "the greater power to forbid im-
ports does not imply a lesser power to allow imports on discriminatory terms" and for
the principle that Section Two of the TWenty-First Amendment authorizes states to
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The plaintiffs in Bridenbaugh argued the need to explore the
"core purposes" of Section Two of the Twenty-First Amend-
ment. 75 The typical line of reasoning in this approach is to argue
that certain "core purposes," embodied in Section Two of the
Twenty-First Amendment, must be sufficiently implicated before
the Twenty-First Amendment can "save" a statute that violates the
Commerce Clause.276 In rejecting this approach, Judge Easter-
brook noted somewhat derisively, "Plaintiffs, fortified chiefly by
district court cases and a student note, insist that the 'core concern'
of the twenty-first amendment is temperance. "277 After reviewing
the history of prohibition, Judge Easterbrook noted that a long es-
tablished pattern of discrimination indeed existed not against out-
of-state interests but against in-state interests.278 The states were
continually frustrated by Commerce Clause challenges in the early
years in their attempt to close loopholes in alcohol regulation.279
Referring to Bowman280 and the original package cases in Leisy as
examples, Judge Easterbrook concluded that Section Two of the
Twenty-First Amendment was designed to provide relief to states
against interminable challenges by out-of-state interests. 281 It is
against this historical interpretation that Judge Easterbrook re-
jected the "core purposes" approach: "If 'core concerns' spelled
the difference, we would follow the Supreme Court rather than dis-
trict courts and student notes. But our guide is the text and history
of the Constitution, not the 'purposes' or 'concerns' that may or
may not have animated its drafters. ' 282 Judge Easterbrook's re-
eliminate economic discrimination caused by cases such as Leisy and Bowman, with-
out authorizing discrimination against out-of-state sellers).
275. Id. at 851.
276. See Shanker, supra note 25, at 374-77 (describing an "accommodation test" in
balancing Twenty-First Amendment and Commerce Clause interests whereby the
court seeks initially to determine whether the challenged statute discriminates against
out-of-state interests; and then to determine whether the Twenty-First Amendment
can save a law that violates the Commerce Clause, focusing on core Twenty-First
Amendment powers).
277. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851 (citation omitted).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Spaeth, supra note 25, at 171 (citing Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125
U.S. 465, 499 (1888), and explaining "that a state could not regulate intoxicating li-
quor under its police power until the liquor had been physically delivered into the
state even though the state could ban the liquor entirely once it arrived.").
281. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
282. Id. at 851.
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verse discrimination argument echoes Justice Brandeis' argument
in Young's Market.183
Justice Easterbrook never addresses the balancing that charac-
terizes modern dormant Commerce Clause analyses.284 Perhaps he
believes it to be fruitless and illogical.2 85 According to his analysis,
the whole point of Section Two was to shield state regulatory
power from Commerce Clause loopholes that historically allowed
"out-of-state sellers to consumers [to] bypass state regulatory (and
tax) systems. 2 86 He continues: "Every use of § 2 could be called
'discriminatory' in the sense that plaintiffs use that term, because
every statute limiting importation leaves intrastate commerce unaf-
fected. ' 287 Presumably this leaves plaintiffs at an automatic advan-
tage to out-of-state interests. "If that were the sort of
discrimination that lies outside state power, then § 2 would be a
dead letter. ' 2 8
Bridenbaugh did not directly address the potential discrimina-
tory effect of allowing in-state shipments direct to consumers while
prohibiting out-of-state shipments. The opinion evades the issue of
discrimination by concluding, "Indiana insists every drop of liquor
pass through its three-tiered system and be subjected to taxation.
Wine originating in California, France, Australia, or Indiana passes
through the same three tiers and is subjected to the same taxes.
Where's the functional discrimination? '289 This, however, is an ex-
pansive interpretation. The only way to reconcile that "Indiana
permits local wineries, but not wineries ... in another state ... to
ship directly to Indiana consumers '290 is to ignore the fact that in-
state shippers only have a single tier to traverse, while out-of-state
shippers have three. The logic appears to conclude that as long as
they all participate in the same three-tier system overall, there is no
discrimination.
283. State Bd. of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62
(1936); see also supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Bolick v Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 430 (E.D.Va. 2002) (criticizing
the Easterbrook decision because it "refused to apply the analysis established by the
Supreme Court," referring to the two-tier dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
285. Id. at 434 (offering another conjecture as to why Judge Easterbrook did not
balance dormant Commerce Clause concerns: "It may be that the Bridenbaugh court
simply deemed the dormant Commerce Clause inapplicable because it started from
the premise that there was a lack of functional discrimination which diverted the
traditional analysis.").
286. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 851.
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Although highly controversial and not widely followed, the Eas-
terbrook approach is nevertheless deeply pragmatic in its own way.
It recognizes the historical difficulty in preserving states' rights
against Commerce Clause challenges. This approach avoids the
subjective and often unpredictable outcomes that result from the
highly individual judgments required when conducting a balancing
test or "core powers" analysis. The variety of outcomes in the ap-
proaches taken by other courts, to some degree, evidences the dis-
parate views that similar fact patterns generate when pressed
through typical Commerce Clause balancing.
It is unfortunate, however, that the decision in Bridenbaugh did
not address more fully the arguments in Bacchus that opponents of
direct-shipping bans often rely on. By simply concluding there was
no discrimination between the out-of-state interests and in-state in-
terests, because both are subject to the three-tier system, the opin-
ion devoted little attention to reconciling the main issue. In at least
one respect, Judge Easterbrook was in a unique position to evalu-
ate the holding in Bacchus in light of the current debate - the
attorney who successfully argued the cause for Bacchus Imports
was none other than Judge Easterbrook himself. Having success-
fully argued the landmark case that has provided the foundation
for many direct-shipping ban challenges, it would have been inter-
esting to see how Judge Easterbrook would have reconciled the
Bacchus opinion with his holding in Bridenbaugh.
2. The Bolick Approach.
The analytical approach that Bridenbaugh avoided was em-
braced by the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia in Bolick v. Roberts.29' This approach applied the two-
tier dormant Commerce Clause analysis as prescribed in Brown-
Forman.2 92 It found a tier-one violation, and concluded that the
challenged statute did not sufficiently implicate the Twenty-First
Amendment core powers to save it.2 93 New York,294 Texas, 2 9 5 and
291. 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 447 (E.D.Va. 2002) (holding Virginia's alcoholic beverage
regulation with respect to out-of-state direct shipping ban unconstitutional).
292. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 578-79 (1986) (noting the Supreme Court "has adopted what amounts to a two-
tiered approach to analyzing state economic regulation under the Commerce
Clause"); see also supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
293. Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (finding that, "While promotion of temperance
through strict control is a legitimate state interest, Virginia's professed interest in this
core concern, as justification for the subject statutory scheme, is fraught with contra-
dictions that lead the Court to conclude its means are not justified by its temperance
policy.").
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North Carolina 9 6 followed the Virginia court's approach as well.
The Bolick approach conducts a more extensive inquiry as to
whether the Twenty-First Amendment should have more or less
weight depending on how much the "core powers" of the Twenty-
First Amendment are judged relevant. 97
The Bolick case was decided before the New York, Texas, and
North Carolina cases. In Bolick,298 the court addressed whether
certain sections of Virginia's ABC law violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause.299 The section in question prohibited out-of-state
shipments of beer, wine, or distilled spirits directly to Virginia con-
sumers while allowing such shipments from in-state producers. °°
The Bolick court explicitly rejected the decision in Bridenbaugh
and Judge Easterbrook's "novel approach, ' 30 1 stating that the Sev-
enth Circuit decision was "improperly decided," because it did not
follow the "established dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 3 2
From there, the analysis applied the traditional dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis30 3 and found the challenged statute facially
discriminated against out-of-state interests in violation of the Com-
294. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (holding the that
state's ban on direct shipments violated the Commerce Clause).
295. Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 675 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding Texas's
prohibition against direct out-of-state wine sales to consumers violates the dormant
Commerce Clause).
296. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 513-14 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e determine first
whether the purported State regulation violates the Commerce Clause without con-
sideration of the Twenty-first Amendment [and then] determine whether the princi-
ples underlying the Twenty-first Amendment are sufficiently implicated to ... out
outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would otherwise be offended." (inter-
nal quotations omitted)); see also, Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C.
2002) (finding certain parts of North Carolina's alcoholic beverage control laws dis-
criminated against out-of-state wine manufacturers while favoring in-state interests,
and concluding the Twenty-First Amendment did not empower the state to erect bar-
riers to interstate competition), affd in part, vacated in part, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th
Cir. 2003).
297. See Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
"if the State demonstrates that its statutory scheme is closely related to a core concern
of the Twenty-first Amendment and not a pretext for mere protectionism, Florida's
statutes can be upheld"); see also Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (noting that "there is
no bright line between federal interests and state powers over liquor ... the compet-
ing state and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those
concerns in a concrete case" (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
298. Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397.
299. Id. at 402.
300. Id. at 417.
301. Id. at 430.
302. Id. at 408.
303. Id. at 410.
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merce Clause.3 °4 It then proceeded to balance whether or not the
core powers of the Twenty-First Amendment were sufficiently im-
plicated so as to save the statute.3 °5 The Bolick court found the
Twenty-First Amendment factors unsatisfactory. 306 By placing
much greater weight on the Commerce Clause violations, the court
declared the challenged statute unconstitutional.30 7 Although the
decision is being appealed,30 8 the approach in Bolick provided the
roadmap for the district courts in North Carolina, Texas, and New
York.
A week after Bolick was decided, the federal district court for
the Western District of North Carolina weighed in with Beskind v.
Easley.30 9 The facts and issue in Beskind paralleled those of the
others. North Carolina had a three-tier system of regulation,
prohibiting direct shipment of wine from out-of-state, while ex-
empting in-state interests. 310 As stated by the court, "The keystone
issue is whether the three-tier system can be selectively applied to
most wineries (including all out-of-state wineries) but suspended
for in-state wineries. ' 311
The court immediately addressed the issue of economic protec-
tionism by inquiring about the motives and purposes of the state
legislators in exempting local wineries from the direct shipment
ban.312 The Beskind court applied the Brown-Forman two-tier
analysis,313 and quickly concluded that "the North Carolina ABC
laws present a relatively cut and dry example of direct discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce." '314 The Beskind court then in-
quired as to whether the state statutes sufficiently implicated
304. Id. at 447 (concluding the "in-state preference for the Virginia wine and beer
industry therefore is impermissible as violative of the dormant Commerce Clause").
305. Id. at 410.
306. Id. at 444 (concluding that, "While promotion of temperance through strict
control is a legitimate state interest, Virginia's professed interest in this core concern
as justification for the subject statutory scheme is fraught with contradictions that lead
the Court to conclude its means are not justified by its temperance policy.").
307. Id. at 450.
308. Dana Nigro, Virginia Poised to Allow Direct Shipments of Wine to Consumers,
Wine Spectator Online, (Feb. 6, 2003) ("Although the state is appealing the
case .... "), at http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Daily/News/0,1145,1966,00.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
309. Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002), affd in part, vacated
in part, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003).
310. Id. at 466-67.
311. Id. at 469.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 471.
314. Id.
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Twenty-First Amendment powers to save the regulation.315 Al-
though the court acknowledged "numerous legitimate reasons" for
the ABC laws generally, it did not find sufficient justification for
the in-state wine seller exemptions. 316  Hence, the court found
North Carolina's regulation unconstitutional.3t 7
Even if the court found a reason for the exemptions, it would
have needed to be extremely compelling. The Beskind court be-
lieved that, "[n]o equilibrium can be achieved when economic pro-
tectionism is placed on one side of the scale, and the Commerce
Clause's need to preserve the respect of the several states for each
other is placed on the opposite side. '31 s
This court also rejected the Easterbrook approach outright, but
did so in a different manner than in Bolick.319 Unlike the Bolick
court, the Beskind court did not conclude Bridenbaugh was im-
properly decided. The court accepted Judge Easterbrook's formu-
lation that the Indiana case did not involve discrimination because
"every drop of liquor" passed through Indiana's three-tier sys-
tem. 320 Therefore, the court reasoned, the Bacchus case, not
Bridenbaugh, was analogous.32' In applying Bacchus, the court
noted that "as long as there is some competition between the lo-
cally produced exempt products and non-exempt products from
outside the State, there is a discriminatory effect. '322
The Beskind court's approach is analogous to Bolick, but in one
sense it may have been more extreme. The combination of the
Beskind court's reliance on the issue of economic protectionism
and its application of the Bacchus case virtually guaranteed a per
se violation of the Commerce Clause.323 Under this analysis it is
315. Id. at 472.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 466 (noting that, "after a thorough review of the record, the Court finds
that the challenged provisions are unconstitutional").
318. Id. at 472-73.
319. Id. at 474.
320. Id. at 475.
321. Id. ("The Seventh Circuit clearly distinguishes the situation in which legisla-
tion is applied unilaterally from one in which unconstitutional niches for in-state busi-
nesses are carved into an otherwise permissible general scheme. The instant case is
analogous to Bacchus, not Bridenbaugh.").
322. Id. at 473 (quoting Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984)).
323. Id. at 473. Citing Bacchus, the Beskind court noted that "economic protec-
tionism" can be found "on the basis of either discriminatory purpose ... or discrimi-
natory effect." Id. Citing Bacchus again, the court noted, "as long as there is some
[read no matter how little] competition between locally produced exempt products
and non-exempt products from outside the State, there is a discriminatory effect." Id.
The Beskind court then concluded that there was competition between North Caro-
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difficult to imagine any reading that would allow North Carolina's
direct-shipment ban to survive this kind of scrutiny. In the end, the
district court in Beskind held the North Carolina direct-shipment
ban to be unconstitutional and enjoined the state from enforcing its
prohibition against out-of-state wine shipments.324
When the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the case
on appeal, Judge Niemeyer affirmed the conclusion that the of-
fending statute was unconstitutional but vacated the remedy or-
dered by the lower court.325 In Easley, Judge Niemeyer began his
analysis in essentially the same manner as the lower court, by con-
ducting a conventional Commerce Clause analysis.326 The Easley
court concluded that the offending statute was facially discrimina-
tory and therefore an impermissible violation of the Commerce
Clause.327 North Carolina offered a number of reasons justifying
the direct-shipping statutes328 but the Easley court concluded that
"North Carolina failed to identify any Twenty-First Amendment
interest that is served by authorizing in-state wineries to sell and
ship directly to consumers while simultaneously prohibiting out-of-
state direct shipment. 329
Although the Fourth Circuit's opinion of April 8, 2003, was a
defeat for direct-shipping ban statutes, it will likely prove a Pyrrhic
victory for the direct-shipping ban opponents. While Judge
Niemeyer affirmed the holding on constitutionality, he vacated the
remedy ordered by the lower court in Beskind.33° The Easley court
reasoned that a ban on out-of-state direct-shipping per se did not
violate the Commerce Clause;331 nor would a ban on instate direct
shipping per se violate the Commerce Clause.332 It was the co-exis-
tence of both that the court reasoned was violative of the Com-
merce Clause.33 3 North Carolina had argued, on appeal, that even
lina wines and wines from other states and hence a discriminatory effect existed. Id.
The Court consequently found the North Carolina statute violated the Commerce
Clause because of economic protectionism. Id.
324. Id. at 476.
325. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003).
326. Id. at 512-13.
327. Id. at 514.
328. Id. at 515 (arguing that physical inspection of out-of-state wineries would be
more difficult, as would tax collection and that the franchise risk for out-of-state ship-
pers was much less than for those with a physical presence in the state thereby offer-
ing less incentive to abide by North Carolina laws).
329. Id. at 517.
330. Id. at 517-18.
331. Id. at 518.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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if the offending statute was unconstitutional, the state had the right
to remedy the situation by simply prohibiting in-state wineries
from shipping directly to consumers while maintaining its regula-
tory prohibitions over out-of-state shippers.334 When given the
choice between affirming the lower court's holding striking out-of-
state shipping bans or siding with the State's desire to only strike
the preference for in-state wineries, the Easley court found no rea-
son to deny North Carolina's preferred remedy.335
The significance of North Carolina's choice to shutdown in-state
preferences in order to maintain its out-of-state prohibitions was
not lost on the Easley court: "Although we recognize the plaintiffs'
interest as oenophiles in promoting the direct shipment of out-of-
state wine and therefore their interest in having the direct-ship-
ment prohibition stricken, their arguments have not established the
illegality of the prohibition itself. 3 36
While the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision may have
been disappointing to the oenophiles from a practical point of
view, it nevertheless was a victory on the issue of the constitution-
ality of discriminatory shipping bans. Both the Court of Appeals
of the Fourth Circuit and the District Court in Beskind v. Easley,
conducted their analysis along similar lines as in Bolick, and ar-
rived at similar conclusions as far as the issue of the constitutional-
ity of the shipping bans were concerned. From that point of view,
the latest opinion from the Fourth Circuit highlights the attraction
of the Bolick approach for those courts that have decided to con-
sider the direct shipping ban issue from within the framework of a
conventional Commerce Clause analysis.
Continuing the Bolick line of cases, in July of 2002, Judge Me-
linda Harmon issued her second opinion on Texas's direct-ship-
ment ban in Dickerson v. Bailey.337 The first opinion, issued on
February 10, 2000, held that Texas's direct-shipment law "violated
the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution [and] that the
statute was not saved by the twenty-first amendment because its
purpose was economic protection of the state's in-state [interests]
at the expense of out-of-state wine sellers, while the statute failed
to serve the legitimate goal of temperance. 338
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
338. Id. at 675.
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Judge Harmon granted a motion for reconsideration of her first
opinion to allow the parties to address the impact of Judge Easter-
brook's opinion.339 After considering the Seventh Circuit opinion,
Judge Harmon adhered to her original conclusions.34 ° The Dicker-
son court expressly followed the district court opinions in Bolick
and Beskind.341 It applied the two-tier Commerce Clause analysis,
conducted a weighing of offsetting factors, and concluded similarly
to Bolick and Beskind.342
Aside from the extensive critique of Judge Easterbrook's opin-
ion,343 the Dickerson opinion recognized recent Supreme Court
cases that reigned in the Commerce Clause, particularly in
noneconomic cases.344 The opinion also noted dissents by current
Supreme Court Justices in several cases pertinent to the issue, par-
ticularly in the Bacchus case.345 Nevertheless, the court stated it
was bound by stare decisis to follow the current majority opinions
on existing law,346 and accordingly followed "the Supreme Court
precedent of the past thirty-five years, the Fifth Circuit's approach
to the tensions between § 2 and the twenty-first amendment in Mc-
Beath, and the district court opinions in Bolick and Beskind. 3 47
The 2002, New York case of Swedenburg v. Kelly3 48 completes
the quartet of cases in this category. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered "whether
the principles underlying Twenty-First Amendment" were suffi-
cient to withstand a Commerce Clause challenge to New York's
ABC law that exempted in-state wineries from the State's direct-
shipment ban.3 49 Like the other cases in this line, it follows the
Commerce Clause two-tier analysis. 350 Finding New York's ABC
law facially discriminatory, the court considered the purpose of the
339. See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (reviewing
the procedural history of Dickerson).
340. Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
341. Id. at 695.
342. Id. at 695 (holding the Texas statute facially unconstitutional).
343. Id. at 679-86.
344. Id. at 694 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and United
States v.Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 695.
348. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
349. Id. at 148.
350. Id. at 144 ("The Supreme Court has established a two-step approach to deter-
mine whether a state or municipal law violates the dormant Commerce Clause.").
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regulation. 351 The court concluded the purpose was not grounded
in temperance but in economic protectionism, noting, "At oral ar-
gument, the Attorney General acknowledged that economic pro-
tectionism was the core purpose of the exceptions. ' 352  Even
without the admitted intent to provide a benefit to local farmers,
the Swedenburg court found the Bolick, Beskind, and Dickerson
line of cases highly persuasive.35 3 Toward the final part of his Com-
merce Clause analysis, Judge Berman wrote, "Most courts that
have addressed a statutory structure similar to New York's-i.e. a
three-tier system which includes a general ban on the direct ship-
ment of out-of-state wine but also contains 'loopholes' in the form
of exceptions for in-state wineries-have found the schemes to be
per se violations of the Commerce Clause. 3 54 Having found eco-
nomic protectionism as a reason for the exception, the court con-
cluded that the New York ban on the direct shipment of out-of-
state wine was unconstitutional. 5
3. The Florida Approach
The third approach begins with the analysis of the lower court in
Bainbridge v. Bush.3 16 Although in Bainbridge v. Turner,"' the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded
the lower court's decision, a comparison of their approaches illus-
trates how both courts utilized similar lines of analysis to render
different results.
In Bainbridge v. Bush, the lower court set the tone, observing
that under the Twenty-First Amendment, "[a] State has 'virtually
complete control' over the importation and sale of liquor and the
structure of its liquor distribution system. ' '351 The court elaborated
that this "is particularly true in the context of the Commerce
351. Id. at 148 ("[W]hether the interest implicated by a state regulation are so
closely related to the powers reserved by the TWenty-first Amendment that the regu-
lation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express
federal policies." (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. V. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1984))).
352. Id. at 146 (quoting the Attorney General at oral argument: "Your Honor, I
believe that the legislative history of that provision [the farm winery exemption] indi-
cates that there was an effort to provide an economic benefit to the local farmers.").
353. Id. at 146-47.
354. Id. at 146.
355. Id. at 136.
356. Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2001), vacated by 311 F.3d
1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
357. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
358. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1310 (citing North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S.
423 (1990) (plurality opinion)).
1894
THE DIRECT SHIPPING OF WINE
Clause, given that the Amendment reserves to the States power to
impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that,
absent the Amendment, would clearly be invalid. ' 35 9 This power,
however, is not unlimited, and the court goes on to say that the
Twenty-First Amendment should not be construed to have "re-
pealed" the Commerce Clause when the issue involves regulation
of alcohol.36°
The analytical framework in Bainbridge v. Bush essentially par-
alleled the Bolick approach. 361' District Judge Whittemore spelled
out the balancing that must be done, by acknowledging the broad
power of the Twenty-First Amendment while recognizing the Su-
preme Court's direction that other parts of the Constitution should
not be ignored.362 Judge Whittemore concluded that, "Accord-
ingly, it must first be determined whether the challenged statutory
scheme violates the Commerce Clause. If [it does], it must then be
determined whether it is saved by the Twenty-First
Amendment. '363
The court found that the Florida statute directly discriminated
against out-of-state interests because it expressly prohibited out-of-
state wineries from shipping directly to customers in Florida, but
had not prohibited in-state interests from doing the same.364 The
next step inquired whether any legitimate local purpose was ad-
vanced, and if so, whether nondiscriminatory alternatives were
available. 365 Because nondiscriminatory alternatives existed that
would serve legitimate state interests, the court concluded the stat-
ute was a per se violation of the Commerce Clause.366
Having completed a tier-one analysis, the lower court moved to
the next step - inquiring whether or not the statute is "saved" by
the Twenty-First Amendment.367 Judge Whittemore recognized
that, "Even if the challenged statutory scheme violates the Com-
359. Id. (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1310 ("In analyzing cases under the dormant Commerce Clause, the
Supreme Court has utilized a two-tiered approach."). This is the same starting point
used in the Magistrate Judge's opinion in Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 424
(E.D. Va. 2002) (noting, "[t]he Supreme Court has adopted a two-tiered approach in
analyzing state economic regulation").
362. Id.
363. Id. (citing Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2000)).
364. Id. at 1311.
365. Id. at 1312 (concluding that the offending statute "can be upheld under the
dormant commerce clause only if it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives").
366. Id. at 1312.
367. Id.
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merce Clause, the Twenty-First Amendment may validate an other-
wise discriminatory statute. '368 The court reasoned that because
the Supreme Court had recognized a three-tier 369 distribution sys-
tem as "unquestionably legitimate, 37 ° the only issue was "whether
the Twenty-First Amendment authorizes the discriminatory impact
occasioned by Florida's statutory scheme." 371
The answer to this question was dispositve for the lower court,
and was determined by considering "whether the interests impli-
cated by a state's regulation are so closely related to the core pow-
ers reserved by the Amendment that the regulation may prevail,
notwithstanding ' 372 the per se violation of the Commerce Clause.
If the state's interests are closely related, the regulation gener-
ally withstands a Commerce Clause challenge unless it also violates
the holding in Bacchus (mere protectionism) or in the Brown-For-
man, Healy, and Hostetter line of cases, where the challenged stat-
ute implicated the extraterritoriality principle by affecting
commerce outside the state.373 Barring these exceptions, Judge
Whittemore reasoned, the statute will survive even if it is a per se
violation of the Commerce Clause 374 - thus echoing the holding in
Bainbridge v. Bush.375
The approach was similar to Bolick, in that it applied the two-
tier dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and found a dormant
Commerce Clause violation. 376 This approach also examined tem-
perance, revenue collection, and orderly markets core powers, but
368. Id.
369. This "three-tier" system refers to the general regulatory scheme adopted by
states in regulating alcoholic beverages and is not to be confused with the "two-tier"
analysis the Supreme Court has prescribed for analyzing possible violations of the
dormant Commerce Clause. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the "three-tier" system); supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing the
"two-tier" analysis).
370. Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (citing North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990)).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1313.
373. Id. at 1315.
374. Id. (distinguishing the exceptions in Healy, Brown-Forman, and Bacchus).
375. Id. (upholding the Florida statute despite the per se Commerce Clause viola-
tion because sufficient Twenty-First Amendment core concerns were sufficiently im-
plicated to save the offending statute).
376. Id. at 1312 ("Florida's regulatory scheme constitutes a per se violation of the
commerce clause.").
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found the Twenty-First Amendment, consistent with its view, heavy
enough to overcome the dormant Commerce Clause violations.377
The holding and analysis in Bainbridge v. Bush allow for regula-
tions that have "mixed motives. '378 In other words, state regula-
tions that have a degree of protectionism can nevertheless survive
Commerce Clause challenge if they are sufficiently mingled with
legitimate state interests. 379 Hence, a protectionist motive is not
considered dispositive.
The lower court in Bainbridge v. Bush expressly contrasted its
holding with Judge Harmon's initial opinion in Dickerson v. Bailey,
and with the denial of a motion to dismiss in Swedenburg v.
Kelly.38° While both those opinions have been superceded by more
recent decisions, the comments are still relevant since the more re-
cent Dickerson opinion tracks its first opinion, and the final hold-
ing in Swedenburg was consistent with the denial of motion to
dismiss. The courts in Dickerson and Swedenburg used the same
basic framework but did not find sufficient Twenty-First Amend-
ment "core concerns" to save the statutes. The lower court in
Bainbridge, however, concluded "these cases [were] of limited per-
suasive value as they fail[ed] to consider the definition of 'core con-
cerns' applied by the Supreme Court in North Dakota.' 381
The struggle to find the correct balance in the Florida approach
is evidenced by the Eleventh Circuit decision in Bainbridge v. Tur-
ner,3 82 vacating the lower court decision and remanding to deter-
mine whether sufficient evidence existed to invoke Twenty-First
Amendment protection.383 Circuit Judge Tjoflat began the analysis
377. Id. at 1315 (holding that, "although Florida's statutory scheme violates the
dormant Commerce Clause, it represents a permissible regulation under the Twenty-
First Amendment").
378. Id. at 1313 (citing Milton S. Kronheim & Co., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 91
F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
379. Id. (citing and referring to the holding in Milton S. Kronheim & Co. that de-
spite a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, a regulation was saved by the
Twenty-First Amendment because it was enacted to serve legitimate state interests
and that administrative and enforcement concerns were sufficient to justify Twenty-
First Amendment protection).
380. Id. at 1314 (citing Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691, 710 (S.D. Tex.2000),
and Swedenburg v. Kelly, No. 00-Civ-0778, 2000 WL 1264285, at* 13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
5, 2000) (decision denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss)).
381. Id. at 1314 n.14.
382. 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
383. Id. at 1106 (concluding that, "if the State demonstrates that its statutory
scheme is closely related to a core concern of the Twenty-First Amendment and not a
pretext for mere protectionism, Florida's statutes can be upheld," but finding, "the
factual record is too incomplete to uphold a judgment as a matter of law for the
State").
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in identical fashion as the lower court, conducting a conventional
two-tier Commerce Clause scrutiny.384 Judge Tjoflat concluded
that "Florida's regulatory scheme cannot withstand tier-one scru-
tiny. ' 385 Like the lower court, the Appellate Court concluded that
alternative nondiscriminatory means did exist.386 After briefly cit-
ing a few nondiscriminatory alternatives, the court found that, "Be-
cause the Florida statutes discriminate against out-of-state retailers
and nondiscriminatory alternatives are available to serve the
State's interests, Florida's regulatory scheme violates the Com-
merce Clause. ' 387 To that point, the Appellate Court's analysis
was almost identical to the lower court's approach in Bainbridge v.
Bush.388
While the lower court in Bainbridge proceeded to the next step
by inquiring if a core concern of the Twenty-First Amendment was
implicated, the Appellate Court in Bainbridge conducted this anal-
ysis with an additional requirement: "When such a concern is im-
plicated, the Amendment removes the constitutional cloud from
the challenged law so long as the state demonstrates that it genu-
inely needs the law to effectuate its proffered core concern. 389
Consistent with the lower court, the Appellate Court added the
proviso that "in no event can the law regulate extraterritoriality,
nor can a law ever be motivated by mere economic
protectionism. "390
This additional layer of proof distinguishes the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's approach from that of the District Court. The Appellate
Court concluded that the state had to show a genuine need for the
challenged law in order to achieve the core concerns.39' The Ap-
pellate Court was not convinced, noting, "In short, the State has
not shown as a matter of law that its regulatory scheme is so
closely related to the core concern of raising revenue as to escape
Commerce Clause scrutiny. ' 392 Reasoning that because a material
issue of fact was undetermined, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
384. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1108.
385. Id. at 1109.
386. Id. at 1110.
387. Id.
388. Id. (stating agreement "with the holding below that there are, in fact, nondis-
criminatory alternatives").
389. Id. at 1112.
390. Id. at 1112 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989), and
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)).
391. Id. at 1115 n.16.
392. Id. at 11.15.
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district court judgment and remanded for further consideration as
to whether there was sufficient proof of genuine need.393
4. The Michigan Hybrid Approach.
The fourth approach, adopted by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Heald v. Engler,394 is
a hybrid approach grounded in three cases - Bridenbaugh v. Free-
man-Wilson, Florida's lower court approach in Bainbridge v. Bush,
and an older New York case, House of York, Ltd. v. Ring.395
The plaintiffs in Heald v. Engler sought summary judgment and
declaratory and injunctive relief because they believed the Michi-
gan liquor laws, prohibiting out-of-state wineries from shipping di-
rectly to Michigan consumers, were unconstitutional.3 96 In
comparing this case to the case of Bainbridge v. Bush, District
Court Judge Bernard A. Friedman noted that, "In all relevant re-
spects, the statutory scheme at issue in Bainbridge is identical to
Michigan's." 397
The Heald court noted that, "[W]hile the case law concerning
direct-shipment laws is sparse, the more persuasive decisions have
found such laws to be constitutional. '398 In choosing these three
cases to support its holding, the Heald court relied on their respec-
tive conclusions rather than their corresponding analytical ap-
proaches. Although the conclusions are similar, the analytical
approaches in Bridenbaugh and Bainbridge are quite different.
Bridenbaugh avoided the two-tier dormant Commerce Clause
analysis while the lower court in Bainbridge embraced the two-tier
analysis.399 The approach in House of York more closely resembles
the Easterbrook approach. House of York, however, was decided
well before the modern Commerce Clause cases, and before some
of the more influential Twenty-First Amendment cases.
393. Id. at 1115-16.
394. Heald v. Engler, Civ. No. 00-CV-71438-DT, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826, at
*15 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2001), rev'd, remanded, No. 01-2720, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
17965 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2003).
395. House of York, Ltd. v. Ring, 322 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
396. Heald, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826, at *4, *18.
397. Heald, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826, at *10.
398. Id. at *9 (citing House of York Ltd., 322 F. Supp. at 536-37 (upholding a New
York statute prohibiting the direct shipment of alcoholic beverages to New York
residents)).
399. See supra notes 269-290 and accompanying text (discussing Easterbrook's ap-
proach); supra notes 356-393 and accompanying text (discussing the Bainbridge
approach).
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The court in Heald simply believed these three cases were cor-
rectly decided, and that direct-shipment laws are a permissible ex-
ercise of Section TWo of the Twenty-First Amendment. °° Judge
Friedman centered his analysis with the premise that the Twenty-
First Amendment gives states wide latitude to regulate alcohol
coming into the state. Elaborating on this premise, Judge Fried-
man noted that, "A series of decisions by the Supreme Court ren-
dered shortly after the ratification of the 21st Amendment made it
abundantly clear that the states were considered to have acquired
plenary authority to deal with intoxicating beverages after importa-
tion."'40 1 While Judge Friedman recognized that the power of the
Twenty-First Amendment was not unlimited and did not eliminate
Commerce Clause considerations, he devoted relatively little atten-
tion to Commerce Clause analysis.402 Instead, Judge Friedman's
opinion briefly reviewed Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, Bain-
bridge v. Bush, and House of York, agreeing with their conclu-
403sions. ° This approach did not concede a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause, but agreed with the lower court in Bainbridge
v. Bush that even if there were such a violation, the Twenty-First
Amendment would provide enough protection to tilt the scales in
favor of the state regulation.
The court recognized the core concerns by noting, "the Michigan
legislature has chosen this path [referring to the out-of-state direct-
shipment ban] to ensure the collection of taxes from out-of-state
wine manufacturers and to reduce the risk of alcohol falling into
the hands of minors. The 21st Amendment gives it the power to do
sO. ' '404 Unlike the appellate court in Bainbridge v. Turner, this
court did not ask for more evidence from the state to prove the
genuine need for the different treatment of out-of-state sellers in
order to achieve any of the core concerns.40 5
400. Heald, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826, at *15.
401. Id. at *9.
402. Id. at *10-16.
403. Id. at *10-15 ("The court believes that the decisions in House of York,
Bridenbaugh and Bainbridge correctly concluded that direct shipment laws are a per-
missible exercise of state power under §2 of the 21st Amendment.").
404. Id. at *18.
405. Id. at *17-18 ("Michigan's direct shipment law is a permitted exercise of state
power under §2 of the 21st Amendment [and] the measure cannot be characterized as
,mere economic protectionism.'").
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III. THE 80 PROOF SOLUTION
A. Guilty Until Proven Innocent
The majority of the courts faced with the issue begin by applying
a conventional dormant Commerce Clause analysis.4 °6 Those who
choose this line of analysis begin with a tier-one inquiry as to
whether the challenged statute violates the dormant Commerce
Clause. The five states that applied this approach (New York,
Texas, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia) all concluded the di-
rect-shipment laws under consideration were facially discrimina-
tory in favoring in-state economic interests over out-of-state
interests.40 7 This conclusion then triggers a balancing test with va-
rying degrees of inquiry as to whether the Twenty-First Amend-
ment can save the offending statute.
This approach, despite its comforting use of a tried-and-true
methodology, is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First, be-
cause of how the issue is framed, the states will always bear the
burden of proof from the outset. The Magistrate Judge's analysis
in Bolick v. Roberts is representative of the shifting in the burden
of proof:
[If the] statutes are per se invalid because they impose barriers
to free trade among the states, the burden shifts to Defend-
ants ... to establish that they nevertheless address a legitimate
state interest so as to support the conclusion that the discrimina-
tory law is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to
economic protectionism and that there are no other nondiscrim-
inatory means of addressing the problem. 40 8
Second, these cases misapply the strict scrutiny standard when
evaluating the degree to which the state regulation implicates the
core concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment.
The nature of this direct-shipping issue, when analyzed under
conventional dormant Commerce Clause methodology, renders the
states guilty until proven innocent. Moreover, should these cases
406. See Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1109 (11th Cir. 2002); Bainbridge v.
Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2001), vacated by 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir.
2002); Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Dickerson v.
Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 695 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d
464, 471 (W.D.N.C. 2002), affd in part, vacated in part, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir.
2003).
407. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1109; Swedenburg, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 147; Dickerson, 212
F. Supp. 2d at 695; Beskind, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
408. Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 424 (E.D.Va. 2002).
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reach the current Supreme Court, it is likely the direct-shipment
laws will survive the Commerce Clause challenge.
B. Full Circle: From Brandeis to Bridenbaugh
1. Bridenbaugh Looks To History
Easterbrook's approach in Bridenbaugh bypasses the entire mo-
rass of Commerce Clause analysis and goes directly to Twenty-First
Amendment considerations. 40 9 Based on the history and back-
ground of Prohibition and its repeal, it construes the power of the
states liberally. 410 The opinion largely avoids determining whether
or not the state's regulation sufficiently implicates the core con-
cerns of the Twenty-First Amendment.41' The Easterbrook ap-
proach assumes the states have a plenary right to regulate alcohol
imports that come into the state and that are destined for use
within its borders.412 That is, the control that states can exercise
over liquor imports is as great as the control that can be exercised
over internal sales. Since states unquestionably have great free-
dom to regulate internal sales, this plenary right to regulate import
should be given wide latitude. The only limitation on this latitude
is a naked exercise of protectionism as represented by the Bacchus
holding,41 3 or any regulation that violates the well established prin-
ciple of extraterritoriality.
This Note suggests that Bridenbaugh stands for the proposition
that courts who look too deeply into whether or not core concerns
are sufficiently implicated by state statutes are missing the point.41 4
One view of Judge Easterbrook's opinion is that the core concern
of the Twenty-First Amendment is very simply to allow the states
as much freedom as possible to regulate alcohol within their own
409. See Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1314, vacated by 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002)
(analyzing Judge Easterbrook's opinion and noting that:
The Seventh Circuit rejected the 'core concerns' inquiry and instead focused
on the text and history of the Twenty-First Amendment ... [and] held that
section two of the Twenty-First Amendment 'enables a state to do to impor-
tation of liquor- including direct deliveries to consumers in original pack-
ages-what it chooses to do to internal sales of liquor, but nothing more.'
(citing Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851, 853 (7th Cir. 2000)).
410. Id.
411. Id; see also Turner, 311 F.3d at 1114 (commenting that the Bridenbaugh court
"jettisoned the 'core concerns' analysis").
412. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853 (concluding that, "§2 [of the Twenty-First
Amendment] enables a state to do to importation of liquor ... what it chooses to do
to internal sales of liquor, but nothing more").
413. See Beskind, 325 F.3d at 514.
414. This author's own interpretation.
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borders.415 Conducting a seemingly endless inquiry as to the com-
ponents of that core purpose, whether it be temperance, tax collec-
tion, or maintaining orderly markets, risks missing the forest for
the trees. By avoiding a conventional commerce clause analysis al-
together, Bridenbaugh implies that applying strict scrutiny is a
flawed approach to examining state justifications as to whether reg-
ulations sufficiently advance the specific goals of the Twenty-First
Amendment.416
Judge Easterbrook's opinion was the only one that emphasized
the logical trap in this controversy when he advanced his "reverse
discrimination" argument.417 The Bridenbaugh opinion recalled
the frustrations of the states in regulating intoxicating liquors
against the loopholes opened by the Leisy and Rhodes courts in the
early years before Prohibition.418 Bridenbaugh argued that
"[e]very use of § 2 could be called discriminatory."4 9 If the test is
whether or not in-state interests are equally burdened by import
regulations, then it is an impossible test to pass because "every
statute limiting importation leaves intrastate commerce unaf-
fected. ' 420 If this is the proper construction of the Twenty-First
Amendment, it appears "§ 2 would be a dead letter. '421 Whether
or not a state regulates imports, the in-state interests will almost
always have some competitive advantage, no matter how small.
Recall that the Beskind court applied Bacchus, and noted that as
long as there was some competition - read, any competition at all
- between in-state exempt interests and out-of-state, non-exempt,
interests, there was a discriminatory effect.422 Framed this way,
this is a relatively low threshold of proof.
415. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853 (reviewing the history of the Eighteenth and
TWenty-First Amendments and concluding that §2 of the Twenty-First Amendment
gave the states the power to close the loopholes left by the dormant Commerce
Clause including direct shipments from out-of-state sellers to consumers that, absent
the Twenty-First Amendment, were able to bypass state regulatory and tax systems).
416. Id. at 851 ("If 'core concerns' spelled the difference, we would follow the Su-
preme Court rather than district courts and student notes. But our guide is the text
and history of the Constitution, not the 'purposes' or 'concerns' that may or may not
have animated its drafters.").
417. Id. at 852-54.
418. Id. at 852.
419. Id. at 853.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
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2. Young's Market Revisited
In Young's Market, California was able to levy a five hundred
dollar tax on imports.423 The importers contended this unfair dis-
crimination violated the Commerce Clause.424 Justice Brandeis'
opinion upholding the California statute clearly stated that the
Twenty-First Amendment "abrogated the right to import free, so
far as concerns intoxicating liquors. '425 These words appear to
support the Easterbrook approach. The Brandeis opinion also ad-
dressed the same logical fallacy contained in Bridenbaugh.
Justice Brandeis highlighted the Hobson's choice facing the
states if the plaintiffs in Young's Market had their way. A state
could prohibit import of liquor, but only if it also prohibited liquor
manufacture within its borders. If, on the other hand, the state
allowed domestic production, it could do so only by allowing all
imported liquor into the state on equal terms. Justice Brandeis
wrote: "To say that, would involve not a construction of the amend-
ment, but a rewriting of it." 426 This is analogous to the argument in
Bridenbaugh.427 At the same time the very argument that Judges
Brandeis and Easterbrook are rebutting appears strikingly similar
to the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Eas-
ley.428 Substituting the key words of the current direct-shipping
ban controversy into Justice Brandeis' argument would render the
following: A state could prohibit direct consumer shipments of
wine by importers, but only if it also prohibited direct wine ship-
ments within its borders. If, on the other hand, the state allowed
domestic, direct wine shipments, it could do so only by allowing all
imported wineries to ship directly to consumers on equal terms. If
Judge Brandeis were writing today, it would not be difficult to im-
agine him criticizing the recent Fourth Circuit opinion for "rewrit-
ing," instead of construing the Twenty-First Amendment.
Young's Market is still good law, but the Bolick line of cases
makes no attempt to deal with its logic. The Dickerson court cites
Young's Market4 29 in passing, making no attempt to reconcile its
423. State Bd. of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 60
(1936).
424. Id. at 61.
425. Id. at 62.
426. Id.
427. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 331-335 and accompanying text.
429. Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 681 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing State Bd.
of Equalization, 299 U.S. at 62, for the proposition that the Court in the early years
"construed the [Twenty-First] amendment as authorizing the states to regulate com-
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logic. Bolick, Beskind, Easley, and Swedenburg also do not address
this argument. Although its logic is timeless, Young's Market was
decided in 1936 and it is likely these courts simply preferred to
ground their analysis on more recent case law.
The virtues of the Easterbrook approach are also its shortcom-
ings. In bypassing the Commerce Clause analysis, particularly the
two-tier inquiry, the Easterbrook approach is vulnerable to criti-
cism as being incomplete, or, as the Bolick court characterized it,
"improperly decided. 4 30 Moreover, in concluding that Indiana's
three-tier system did not discriminate against out-of-state wineries
since they, along with in-state wineries, were all subject to the same
three-tier system, the Bridenbaugh opinion did not provide a con-
vincing argument. One commentator who disagreed with that con-
clusion wrote, "As a practical matter, that declaration is patently
silly." 431
The Easterbrook approach, for all its strengths and weaknesses
has not garnered much of a following. Most courts that have con-
sidered the issue of direct-shipment bans have chosen different
paths of analysis, often criticizing Bridenbaugh along the way.
Even when arriving at a similar conclusion affirming a direct-ship-
ping ban, such as the lower court in Bainbridge v. Bush, these
courts have felt compelled to acknowledge recent case law by in-
corporating an explicit Commerce Clause framework into their
opinions.
C. Accommodating The Commerce Clause Framework
With important cases such as Brown-Forman, Healy, Bacchus,
and North Dakota all dealing with reconciling interests of the Com-
merce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment, it is not unreason-
able to incorporate these decisions into the analytic framework.
Such is the strength of the line of cases using the Bolick and Flor-
ida approaches. There is compelling logic in synthesizing modern
Commerce Clause analysis into the framework. The approach
would take into consideration current thinking and avail itself of
more case law, even if not exactly on point.
The problem with this analysis is that it always begins with the
finding that the state statutes are per se violations of the Com-
merce Clause, shifting the burden of proof to the defendants. Ef-
merce in alcoholic beverages unfettered by the limitations of the dormant commerce
clause").
430. See supra text accompanying note 302.
431. Lorde Martin, supra note 246, at 70.
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fectively, however, the burden never shifts because plaintiffs have
the inside track from the beginning. Because it is virtually certain
these statutes will not survive tier-one analysis, the states will al-
ways bear the burden of proof to justify the next step in the Com-
merce Clause chain of reasoning.
The Heald court avoids this initial finding, developing a hybrid
approach where it accepted the conclusion, not the analysis of the
lower court in Bainbridge v. Bush, and buttressed its reasoning
with Bridenbaugh and York, two cases that did not use the two-tier
Commerce Clause inquiry. The Heald approach is weakened
somewhat since the appellate court in Bainbridge vacated the
lower court decision and remanded it for further consideration.
The York case, decided in 1970, predating the more important
cases, is a Second Circuit decision contradicting somewhat the
Swedenburg court. That leaves Heald with only one leg of support,
the Easterbrook decision.
One way around this obstacle would be to offset this initial hand-
icap with a reasonable standard of proof at the subsequent stage of
the inquiry. During this stage, the analysis focuses on the extent to
which state regulations implicate core concerns of the Twenty-First
Amendment. Often the analysis here turns murky because so
many subjective elements come into play. There is even some disa-
greement among the courts as to which core concerns are legiti-
mate. For example, Judge Berman in Swedenburg, posited, "As a
threshold matter, it is not entirely clear that the collection of taxes
is, in and of itself, a core concern of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment."43 Judge Whittemore, on the other hand, in Bainbridge v.
Bush, writes, "Recent case law has recognized that there are vari-
ous 'core concerns' of the twenty-first amendment, including tem-
perance, raising revenue and 'ensuring orderly market conditions.'
This expanded understanding of what constitutes a 'core con-
cern' . . . must be applied to the constitutional analysis in this
case. "4 33 Yet another perspective, evidencing the subjectivity of
opinions, is contained in Circuit Judge Roney's dissent in Bain-
bridge v. Turner. Judge Roney would have affirmed the decision in
Bainbridge v. Bush based on the reasoning of the district court.434
Judge Roney writes in his dissent:
432. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
433. Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1313 (M.D. Fla. 2001), vacated by
311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
434. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1116 (11th Cir. 2002).
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In these credit card days of easy purchase by telephone and in-
ternet, this statute reflects the 'core' concerns of the 21st
Amendment that alcoholic beverages not be sold to underage
consumers and not be sold effectively unregulated and untaxed.
This court improperly treats as equal the prospective loss of a
beverage license to an in-state firm and the loss of a Florida
beverage license of an out-of-state firm, if one is required at all.
One would put the firm out of business, the other would simply
restrict the market by a state.435
This concept of "franchise risk" that Judge Roney brings out has
a commonsense appeal, although it is largely ignored or down-
played by the courts in New York, Texas, North Carolina, and Vir-
ginia. The very same arguments echoing Judge Roney's dissent
were actually made by North Carolina in Easley,4 36 but without ef-
fect. Perhaps the problem of such disparate opinions stems from
the fact that the analysis begins with a per se violation of the Com-
merce Clause, triggering strict scrutiny.
D. Strict Scrutiny Scrutinized
Typically, a violation of the Commerce Clause triggers a strict
scrutiny analysis,437 demanding nearly one hundred percent proof
that the violation is justifiable under the circumstances. 438 The
lower court in Bainbridge v. Bush expressly cited the strict scrutiny
435. Id.
436. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 514 (4th Cir. 2003); see supra note 328 and
accompanying text.
437. Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 424 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citing City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624-27 (1978) when noting that the Court
must apply strict scrutiny in evaluating dormant Commerce Clause claims); Dickerson
v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2002). In support of its reasoning the
court noted:
[T]he Supreme Court has consistently indicated that a court must apply strict
scrutiny when examining claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, re-
quiring the state to demonstrate that its regulations are closely related to its
powers reserved by the Twenty-First amendment and that the statutes pro-
mote core concerns of that amendment.
Id. at 682 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624-27 (1978) and
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984)); see also Bainbridge v. Bush,
148 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (noting "[T]he Supreme Court employs
strict scrutiny and will uphold the statute only where the challenged statute advances
a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives.") vacated by 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002).
438. "In order for a law to survive such scrutiny, the state must prove that the
discriminatory law is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism, and that there are no nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to pre-
serve the local interests at stake . . . ." Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (quoting Waste
Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 333 (4th Cir. 2001)).
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standard in its opinion.43 9 After finding a per se violation of the
Commerce Clause, however, it nevertheless upheld the Florida
statute against the constitutional challenge."40 The appellate court
in Bainbridge, on the other hand, vacated and remanded the deci-
sion for lack of proof.4 4 1
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Easley applied strict
scrutiny when it inquired into nondiscriminatory alternatives to
North Carolina's ABC laws, after Judge Niemeyer had concluded
the offending statutes were facially discriminatory.442 The Dicker-
son and Bolick courts also cited the strict scrutiny standard, and
declared the disputed statutes unconstitutional.443 The conclusions
rest on where in the chain of logic strict scrutiny is applied.
Determining the proper degree of scrutiny and at what point to
apply it is the key to reconciling the different approaches. The
Florida companion cases of Bainbridge v. Bush and Bainbridge v.
Turner illustrate this point. Both use the same Commerce Clause
framework, but arrive at different answers.444
The approach in Turner was essentially the same as that of the
lower court in Bush. Both began with a determination that the
challenged statute was facially discriminatory.445 Both courts made
this determination for the same reasons, namely, the Florida stat-
ute discriminated against out-of-state economic interests in viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause.446 Conventional Commerce Clause
439. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
440. Id. at 1315 (finding that despite violating the dormant commerce clause, the
Florida statute is a valid exercise of Florida's power even as applied to out-of-state
wineries because the scheme implicates the "core concerns" of the Twenty-First
Amendment).
441. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1106 (explaining that if the State can demonstrate that its
statutory scheme is closely related to a core concern of the Twenty-First Amendment
and not a pretext for mere protectionism, Florida's statute can be upheld but conclud-
ing the factual record was too incomplete to uphold a judgment as a matter of law for
the State and thereby vacating and remanding the lower court decision).
442. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 2003).
443. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Bolick, 199
F. Supp. 2d at 397.
444. See supra Part III.C.3.
445. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1109 (expressing agreement "with the district court that the
statute discriminates on its face").
446. Id. at 111.0 ("Because the Florida statutes discriminate against out-of-state re-
tailers and nondiscriminatory alternatives are available to serve the State's interests,
Florida's regulatory scheme violates the Commerce Clause."); see also Bainbridge v.
Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2001) ("[B]ecause the Florida regulatory
scheme discriminates against out-of-state retailers and nondiscriminatory alternatives
are available to serve the legitimate state interests, Florida's regulatory scheme con-
stitutes a per se violation of the Commerce Clause.").
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reasoning suggests it is at this point, where the court evaluates the
least restrictive means of accomplishing the state's interests, that
strict scrutiny is applied.447 That part of the strict scrutiny analysis
involves an inquiry into available alternatives. As explained by the
court in Bainbridge v. Bush: "In those cases, the Supreme Court
employs strict scrutiny and will uphold the statute only where the
challenged statute advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot
be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives."44 At this point in the analysis, both the district and appel-
late courts concluded the Florida statute could not survive tier-one
scrutiny.449 As the Eleventh Circuit expressed in Bainbridge
v. Turner: "If the scheme directly regulates or discriminates against
interstate commerce or when its effect is to favor in-state economic
interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down
the statute without further inquiry. "450
Most courts applying the conventional Commerce Clause analy-
sis arrive at this point.451 The problem they then face is determin-
ing how the Twenty-First Amendment impacts this methodology.
The courts frame the problem in the following manner: once the
challenged regulation violates the Commerce Clause, it will be
struck down unless it can be saved by the Twenty-First Amend-
ment. The only way it can be saved is by an inquiry into the mo-
tives or purposes of the challenged regulation.452 If the inquiry
reveals motives or purposes that further the core concerns of the
Twenty-First Amendment, the statute survives. All courts agree
that a regulation that attempts to affect commerce outside its juris-
diction453 or is merely protectionist in purpose 454 will be struck
down.
447. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
448. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 (citing New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
449. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1109 (concluding that "Florida's regulatory scheme cannot
withstand tier-one scrutiny."); Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 131.2 (concluding "Florida's
regulatory scheme constitutes a per se violation of the Commerce Clause").
450. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986)).
451. The courts discussed in this note under the Bolick Approach and the Florida
Approach all utilize conventional dormant Commerce Clause analysis and during the
tier-one inquiry they all concluded the direct shipping statutes to be per se violations
of the dormant Commerce Clause.
452. See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (review-
ing recent related litigation and discussing the conclusions in Dickerson, Bainbridge,
Bolick, Beskind and Easley ).
453. Following the Yosemite Park and Healy line of cases.
454. Following Bacchus.
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Because the direct-shipping bans, however, do not fall into either
of the two categories, the courts must determine if the motive or
purposes sufficiently implicate the core concerns of the Twenty-
First Amendment. The lower court in Bainbridge v. Bush con-
ducted this inquiry at less than strict scrutiny, opening the door to
statutes with mixed motives.455 The appellate court conducted this
inquiry with a higher degree of scrutiny, and vacated and re-
manded the decision for further fact finding consistent with its
opinion. Interestingly, in a footnote, the appellate court noted:
"This evidentiary standard is far less than the strict scrutiny re-
quired under a traditional tier-one analysis of discriminatory laws.
For example, the State need not show that there are no nondis-
criminatory alternatives available." 456
The Eleventh Circuit in Bainbridge indicated it was following the
methodology in Bacchus and in a case from the D.C. Circuit,
Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia.457 It is notewor-
thy that the Kronheim court also applied less than strict scrutiny in
its opinion at this point of its analysis. In Kronheim, the D.C. Cir-
cuit decided a case challenging a D.C. liquor warehousing law.458
The Kronheim court accepted a "mixed motive" by the District
where legitimate reasons coincided with clearly protectionist mo-
tives but upheld the local statute because of Twenty-First Amend-
ment considerations.459  The Kronheim approach appears
consistent with a rational relationship level of scrutiny in which any
plausible reason will suffice.
As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bainbridge pointed
out, strict scrutiny is characterized not only by a heightened stan-
dard of inquiry, but also by an inquiry into alternative, nondiscrim-
inatory means. 460 The courts in Bolick v. Roberts, Dickerson v.
Bailey, and Swedenburg v. Kelly applied this standard in their final
455. See supra text accompanying notes 378 - 379.
456. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 n.17 (11th Cir. 2002).
457. Id. at 1108 (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) and
Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia, 91 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see
also Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp.2d 397, 436-37 (E.D.Va. 2002).
458. Kronheim, 91 F.3d at 195.
459. Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1313 (M.D.Fla. 2001), vacated by 311
F.3d 1.104 (11th Cir. 2002) (reviewing the facts and holding in Kronhein).
460. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1115 n.17 ("This evidentiary standard is far less than the
strict scrutiny required under a traditional tier-one analysis of discriminatory laws.
For example, the State need not show that there are no nondiscriminatory alternatives
available.").
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deliberations.461 The district court in Beskind v. Easley sidestepped
this issue by inferring that the state, while justifying the broad
ABC laws, had not given any specific evidence for the differing
treatment of out-of-state winery shipment. The court, therefore,
was left with no alternative but to surmise that the North Carolina
statute was supported by mere protectionist motivations that were
impermissible under Bacchus. 462 The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, on the other hand, in affirming the district court's finding as
to the constitutionality of the direct-shipping bans, applied a
straight-forward strict scrutiny analysis in arriving at its
conclusion.463
Finally, in Bainbridge v. Turner, although the court expressly
noted that it was using a "far less than the strict scrutiny required
under a traditional tier-one analysis, 464 it went on to raise ques
tions in its holding that sound suspiciously consistent with a strict
scrutiny analysis. For example, on the issue of taxes:
What is so unique about the geographic location of out-of-state
wineries that makes taxing them so difficult that they are forced
(unlike their in-state counterparts) into the three-tier distribu-
tion system? After all, in-state wineries are taxed directly, and
this alternative therefore appears to be a viable substitute to the
three-tier taxation scheme.465
461. Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (explaining the state must "demonstrate that
there are no other nondiscriminatory means of accomplishing the same legitimate
goals."); Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 695 (S.D.Tex. 2002) ( holding the
State had not shown that its core interests in taxation and orderly market conditions
"could not be effected by alternative, nondiscriminatory options."); Swedenburg v.
Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining the "Court does not dis-
cern that the statutes advance a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives." (internal quotations omitted)).
462. Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464, 472 (W.D.N.C. 2002) affd in part,
vacated in part, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003)).
463. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003).
464. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1115 n.17. Although beyond the scope of this Note, the
decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bainbridge v. Turner, in remand-
ing the case for fact finding reasons, may itself raise an interesting issue in light of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145-146 (1986), wherein
the Court criticized the appellate court for reviewing the lower court's fact finding.
"Although the proffered justification for any local discrimination against interstate
commerce must be subjected to the strictest scrutiny, the empirical component of that
scrutiny, like any other form of factfinding, is the basic responsibility of district courts,
rather than appellate courts." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
465. Turner, 311 F.3d at 1115.
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E. Reconciling the Approaches
The courts that have approached the issue of out-of-state wine
shipments with a conventional Commerce Clause framework differ
in their conclusions, depending on what level of scrutiny is applied
at the final point of analysis.466 This is the point where they typi-
cally inquire as to whether the motives or purposes behind the
challenged regulation sufficiently advance the core concerns of the
Twenty-First Amendment to justify a per se violation of the Com-
merce Clause. The Easterbrook approach avoids this line of rea-
soning altogether by essentially taking the position that the core
concern of the Twenty-First Amendment is not the detailed minu-
tiae of temperance, tax collection, or orderly market conditions,
but the overall plenary right of the states to regulate alcohol within
their borders. Nevertheless, even Easterbrook acknowledged that
"the greater power to forbid imports does not imply a lesser power
to allow imports on discriminatory terms. ' 467
The criticism of Easterbrook's opinion rests mainly on the fact it
did not include the conventional Commerce Clause two-tier frame-
work.468 On the other hand, courts following the Easterbrook ap-
proach would likely criticize the Bolick approach for misapplying
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis by not giving full weight to
the power implied by the Twenty-First Amendment. They would
extend the critique by reminding the followers of the Bolick ap-
proach that the dormant Commerce Clause framework was born
out of a need to address a constitutional issue that exists only in the
minds of the courts and not in the text of the Constitution itself.
Since the Twenty-First Amendment is, after all, an express part of
the Constitution, its modification of a conventional dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis should be much greater than what the courts
permitted in Virginia, North Carolina, Texas, and New York.
Those in the Easterbrook camp who believe the history of the
Twenty-First Amendment has been largely forgotten and that the
plenary power the Amendment gives the states has been wrong-
fully mitigated, echo the sentiment of the dissent in Brown-Forman
where Justice Stevens noted: "[F]or some of us who were 'present
at the creation' of the Twenty-First Amendment, there is an aura of
466. The Bolick, Beskind, Dickerson, and Swedenburg courts struck down the stat-
utes while the lower court in Bainbridge upheld the statute. The appellate court in
Bainbridge v. Turner concluded insufficient evidence to render a final judgment and
vacated and remanded the lower court's decision. Id. at 115-16.
467. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000).
468. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
1912
THE DIRECT SHIPPING OF WINE
unreality in [the] assumption that we must examine the validity of
New York's Alcoholic Beverage Control Law just as we would ex-
amine the constitutionality of a state statute governing the sale of
gasoline. "469
Florida hinted at reconciliation in the Eleventh Circuit opinion
in Turner by explicitly recognizing that a standard somewhat less
than strict scrutiny should be applied at the tail end of the analysis.
The Eleventh Circuit's failure to reverse the lower court's decision
opens the door to compromise.
The Easterbrook approach would probably apply rational basis
scrutiny. This appears to be what the Kronheim court chose when
it held that "mixed motives" could survive a Commerce Clause
challenge.470 This allows even somewhat protectionist motives to
coexist with legitimate motives in a state regulation concerning
alcohol.
The Bolick approach would argue for maintaining strict scrutiny
when evaluating whether a challenged regulation implicated the
Twenty-First Amendment sufficiently to justify a per se violation of
the Commerce Clause. This is in fact the approach Virginia, North
Carolina, Texas, and New York used. With strict scrutiny, any pro-
tectionist legislation could not survive if alternative, nondiscrimina-
tory means existed.
Both approaches can be reconciled within the two-tier frame-
work if the courts apply an intermediate level of scrutiny. The two-
tier framework would acknowledge the Supreme Court decisions
of the past thirty years and give proper weight to the dormant
Commerce Clause, while less than strict scrutiny would acknowl-
edge the "text and history of the Constitution. ' 471 The suggested
level of intermediate scrutiny gives a slight edge to the strict scru-
tiny camp because current Supreme Court cases such as Bacchus,
although not directly on point, are more in the strict scrutiny camp.
Most district courts appear to argue that, in the absence of a Su-
preme Court decision on the issue, they are governed by the prece-
dents in their circuits.472
469. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
590 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Judge Friendly, Battipaglia v. New York
Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1984)).
470. See supra text accompanying notes 457 - 459.
471. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851.
472. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 694 (S.D.Tex. 2002) (noting that,
"this Court must follow the rulings of the Fifth circuit" and the majority opinions of
the Supreme Court); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 408 (E.D.Va. 2002)
(agreeing with the Magistrate's analysis that Bridenbaugh was improperly decided be-
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This less-than-strict-scrutiny approach is essentially the solution
suggested by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bainbridge
v. Turner when it remanded the case back to the district court. Al-
though this suggested reconciliation would incorporate the con-
cerns represented by the Easterbrook and the Bolick approaches, it
does not answer the question of how the Supreme Court would
likely decide if it granted certiorari.
F. If The Supreme Court Granted Certiorari
Judge Melinda Harmon alluded to this question in her thought-
ful opinion in Dickerson v. Bailey, where she noted the recent
trend in recent Supreme Court decisions strengthening states'
rights at the expense of federal powers under the Commerce
Clause.47 3 Further, Judge Harmon stated:
More specifically this Court recognizes that in dissents to some
of the key cases involving the relationship between the Com-
merce Clause and the twenty-first amendment, cited and relied
upon by this Court, some of the current members of the high
court have individually indicated that the focus of such analysis
should not be legislative motivation, core purposes or legitimate
goals, have suggested that the implied dormant Commerce
Clause should not have the limiting power over the commerce
of alcohol that the majority opinion of the Supreme Court has
given it and that it does have in regulation of other interstate
goods, and have broadly defined the power given to the states
under the twenty-first amendment to regulate importation and
sale of out-of-state liquor in a manner similar to the position of
Judge Easterbrook.474
Notably, the three members of the Supreme Court dissenting in
Bacchus were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens and
O'Connor.4 75 Bacchus was decided in 1984,476 when the makeup
of the Court was less conservative than it is now. These three Jus-
tices again joined together to dissent in Healy v. Beer Institute.477
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
cause it did not rely upon established dormant Commerce Clause analysis by which
the court is bound).
473. Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
474. Id.
475. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 278 (1984) (dissenting opinion
by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor).
476. Id.
477. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 345 (1.989) (dissenting opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor).
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The Court in the present cases barely pays lipservice to the addi-
tional authority of the States to regulate commerce and alco-
holic beverages granted by the Twenty-first Amendment.
Neglecting to consider that increased authority is especially dis-
turbing here where the perceived proscriptive force of the Com-
merce Clause does not flow from an affirmative legislative
decision and so is at its nadir.47 8
The dissent again echoes Easterbrook's concerns. Since Bacchus
and Healy, the current Supreme Court - with the addition of Jus-
tice Thomas - has a more conservative leaning, particularly re-
garding states rights.
In the cases referred to by Judge Harmon, Printz v. United
States479 and United States v. Lopez, 480 Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. These same four dissented in an-
other case widely interpreted as operating to limit the Commerce
Clause, United States v. Morrison.481 These cases, however, dealt
more with the issue of Commerce Clause powers in noneconomic
fact patterns. As a result, it is unclear how Justices Breyer, Gins-
burg, and Souter would reason on the direct-shipment issue, even
though their dissents in these cases put them in the camp of ex-
panded commerce powers. This is particularly uncertain because
Justice Stevens joined them in dissent, while also joining the dissent
in Healy, and authoring the dissent in Bacchus.
Based on the dissenting opinions in Bacchus and Healy, it would
seem more likely than not that Chief Justice Rehnquist,48 and Jus-
tices Stevens and O'Connor would retain their views regarding the
approach to the Twenty-First Amendment. Justices Scalia and
Thomas would probably lean toward the Rehnquist, Stevens, and
O'Connor approach. Since the direct shipment of wine is an eco-
nomic issue, it is unclear how the more liberal, pro-Commerce
Clause members of the bench would vote; especially bearing in
mind Justice Stevens, while joining with them in Printz, Lopez, and
478. Id. at 349.
479. United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (limiting the power of the
federal government to compel local law enforcement officers to conduct background
checks on prospective handgun purchasers).
480. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (affirming a district court's
reversal of the conviction of a high school student for gun possession in violation of
the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 ruling the law was beyond the reach of the
commerce power).
481. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (striking down a federal
law creating a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence).
482. Recall Chief Justice Rehnquist also dissented in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
217-18 (1976).
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Morrison, would probably vote to strengthen state powers under
the Twenty-First Amendment. On balance, it appears that the
Twenty-First Amendment would likely play a larger role with the
current Court. If the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a direct-
shipment case, the state regulations would more than likely survive
a Commerce Clause challenge.
CONCLUSION
This Note has addressed the recent series of cases challenging
state regulations that prohibit out-of-state direct wine shipments to
consumers while exempting in-state wineries from the same re-
straints. Opponents of the direct-shipment laws have challenged
these statutes based on a theory of interstate discrimination in vio-
lation of the dormant Commerce Clause.483 States have contended
that the Twenty-First Amendment permits them the freedom to en-
act these statutes.48 4
While analyzing the different approaches various courts have
taken in considering the issue, this Note has identified two major
doctrinal camps. In one camp, represented by Judge Frank Easter-
brook's opinion in Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, the Twenty-
First Amendment plays almost a solo role in deciding the issue.
This approach, in reviewing the history and text of the Amend-
ment, recognizes that the primary concern of the Amendment is in
giving the states a plenary right to regulate alcohol within their
borders. The Easterbrook camp interprets this plenary right with
the history of Prohibition firmly in mind, particularly with respect
to the many frustrations the states experienced in the mid-nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries where Commerce Clause chal-
lenges continuously and successfully blocked state attempts to
regulate alcohol.
The Easterbrook camp puts significant weight on the fact that
this tension was ultimately resolved by a Constitutional amend-
ment manifestly favoring state power. This trump card can win in
nearly all balancing tests against the dormant Commerce Clause,
except for regulations that exist solely for protectionist motiva-
tions, and regulations that violate the principle of extraterritoriality
by affecting commerce outside its jurisdiction. But in applying
these principles, the Easterbrook approach appears liberal in giv-
ing the Twenty-First Amendment wide latitude. With respect to
483. See supra text accompanying note 267.
484. See supra notes 269-290 & 356-388 and accompanying text.
1916
THE DIRECT SHIPPING OF WINE
the issue of direct-shipment bans, this camp believes the power to
regulate alcoholic imports for use within a state's borders should
be equal to or very nearly equal to the power to regulate alcohol
within its borders.
The other major doctrinal camp45 believes the Supreme Court
has consciously moved away from the expansive reading of the
Twenty-First Amendment as expressed in the Court's early opin-
ions in the 1930s. The modern approach generally incorporates
federal interests over those of the states and, as such, explicitly
deals with the dormant Commerce Clause. This approach operates
to limit state power even in the absence of explicit federal legisla-
tion when the resulting statutes materially burden interstate com-
merce, or openly discriminate against out-of-state economic
interests in favor of in-state interests. The modern approach ap-
plies a strict scrutiny analysis to per se violations of the Commerce
Clause and hence, will look very carefully for the existence of alter-
native nondiscriminatory means to effect state interests. Per se vi-
olations will generally be struck down if any nondiscriminatory
alternatives exist. This is a high standard and in practice very few
offending statutes survive a strict scrutiny analysis. For those who
apply the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the very nature of
the direct-shipping bans trigger per se violations of the dormant
Commerce Clause because, on their face, they openly discriminate
against out-of-state wineries in favor of in-state wineries. This
camp then shifts the burden of proof to the states who must pro-
vide satisfactory, non-protectionist motivations in order to save the
offending statutes by resorting to the Twenty-First Amendment.
For the modern dormant Commerce Clause camp, the Twenty-First
Amendment plays a supporting role in this drama. At best it can
co-star, but in no event will it ever play the solo role scripted by the
Easterbrook camp.
In reconciling these different approaches, this Note has sug-
gested a pragmatic analytical approach, incorporating the modern
dormant Commerce Clause framework, but substituting an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny for the conventional strict scrutiny that
most courts have applied. The compromise properly respects both
parts of the Constitution-the Twenty-First Amendment and the
dormant Commerce Clause.
The likely outcome in applying this approach is that most direct-
shipment bans would probably survive constitutional challenges.
485. See supra notes 291-353 and accompanying text.
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Although this result will disappoint the legions of wine connois-
seurs and perhaps force them to look to the state legislatures for
relief, this Note further argued that the result of this modified
Commerce Clause analysis would not be too far from what the cur-
rent Supreme Court would actually decide if certiorari were
granted in a direct-shipment case.
While no direct-shipment case has been granted certiorari by the
Supreme Court, this Note concludes that if such a case were to be
heard by the current Justices, the direct-shipment laws would more
than likely survive a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. This is
based largely on the record of dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, in several important
cases in recent history. These Justices have argued against what
they have perceived to be wrongful mitigation of states' rights
under the Twenty-First Amendment. Moreover, the conservative
tendency of the current Court, as reflected in several recent
noneconomic cases widely understood to further restrain federal
powers under the Commerce Clause, would likely enhance the
probability that greater Twenty-First Amendment power would
emerge from any case heard by the current bench.
This Note began with an observation that certain wine connois-
seurs and their legal advocates have consciously tried to get the
Supreme Court to decide on the legality of direct-shipping bans as
it pertains to wine. This Note ends with the observation that these
oenophiles may indeed get what they wish for but the result, like a
vintage bottle of rare wine, may not be to everyone's taste.
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